Women\u27s Wages in Australia and the United States by Willborn, Steven L. et al.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 71 | Issue 2 Article 8
1992
Women's Wages in Australia and the United States
Steven L. Willborn
Univeristy of Nebraska Lincoln College of Law, willborn@unl.edu
Robert G. Gregory
Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University,
bob.gregory@anu.edu.au
Anne E. Daly
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Steven L. Willborn, Robert G. Gregory, and Anne E. Daly, Women's Wages in Australia and the United States, 71 Neb. L. Rev. (1992)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol71/iss2/8
Women's Wages in Australia
and the United States
Steven L. Willborn*
Robert G. Gregory"
Anne E. Daly***
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................................... 581
II. Women's Wages in Australia .............................. 584
A. The Wage-Setting Process ............................ 585
B. Women's Pay .......................................... 597
1. History ............................................ 597
2. The Equal Pay Efforts ............................. 601
3. Women's Pay Under Formal Equality-1969 to the
Present ............................................ 609
HI. Women's Wages In The United States-Perspectives From
the Australian Experience ................................. 615
A. Equal Pay and Comparable Worth in the United
States: Are the Australian Equal Pay Decisions
Equivalent? .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  616
B. Is There Sex Discrimination in Wage Setting in the
United States? ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  624
C. Women's Wages in the United States-Messages from
Australia .............................................. 635
IV. Appendix .................................................. 640
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1960, the earnings ratio between female workers and male
workers was about sixty percent in both the United States and Austra-
lia.' Sex discrimination was undeniably a factor that depressed the
ratio in both countries. In Australia, the principal institution for set-
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ting wages-the industrial tribunals-explicitly discriminated against
women, 2 while in the United States discrimination was sufficiently
prevalent that Congress was soon to react to suppress it by passing the
Equal Pay Act 3 and Title VII.4 In 1981, after a decade of efforts in
both countries to reduce the level of discrimination against women,
the earnings ratio in the United States had decreased marginally to 59
percent,5 while the earnings ratio in Australia had increased quite sig-
nificantly to 75 percent.6 Today, after a quarter-century of antidis-
crimination efforts, Australian women are still paid significantly more
than American women compared to men in their respective countries.
In 1988, the earnings ratio was 78 percent in Australia and 66 percent
in the United States.7
This article compares the experiences of Australia and the United
States in dealing with women's wages. The comparison holds consid-
erable promise for insight (and, we think, delivers on that promise)
because of similarities between the two countries and, ironically, be-
cause of their differences.
Prior to the efforts in Australia from 1969 to 1975 to increase the
relative wages of women, the labor markets in Australia and the
United States produced strikingly similar results for female workers.
Most significantly for our purposes, as indicated above, the ratio of
female-to-male earnings was similar in the two countries, hovering
around the sixty percent mark. The similarities, however, extended
beyond that ratio. There was a considerable degree of occupational
segregation in both countries and a clear correlation between the pro-
portion of females in an occupation and low pay for that occupation.8
2. See infra notes 91-123 and accompanying text.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
5. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, No. 174 CURRENT POPU-
LATION REPORTS (1981).
6. AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, AVERAGE EARNINGS AND HOURS OF EMPLOY-
EEs AUSTRALIA, Cat. No. 6304 (1981).
7. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, No. 174 CURRENT POPU-
LATION REPORTS (1988); AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, AVERAGE EARNINGS
AND HOURS OF EMPLOYEES AUSTRALIA, Cat. No. 6304 (1988). The earnings ratio
varies depending on the precise way in which it is measured. The ratio for the
United States compares the annual earnings of year-round, full-time workers; the
ratio for Australia compares the weekly earnings of full-time non-managerial
workers in the private sector.
8. In Australia, see LEONARD BROOM ET AL., OPPORTUNrrY AND ATTAINMENT IN
AUSTRALIA (1977); Margaret Power, Woman's Work is Never Done-by Men" A
Socio-Economic Model of Sex Typing in Occupations, 17 J. INDUS. REL. 225 (1975).
In the"United States, see Jane Bayes, Occupational Sex Segregation and Compa-
rable Worth, in COMPARABLE WORTH, PAY EQUITY, AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 15 (Rita
Kelly & Jane Bayes eds., 1988); Solomon Polachek, Women in the Economy: Per-
spectives on Gender Inequality, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80s 34
(1984).
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Moreover, although there were differences in the participation and
unemployment rates of women relative to men in the two countries,
the movements in these rates were quite similar both before and after
the Australian equal pay efforts.9 Australia is a good comparator
country, then, because these similarities indicate that the two labor
markets were treating women in a roughly similar fashion prior to
Australia's efforts to increase women's pay.
Australia is also a good comparator country because of its differ-
ences from the United States. In both Australia and the United States
(and elsewhere), a complicated and interrelated variety of discrimina-
tory and non-discriminatory factors influence wages and result in a
female-male wage gap. Factors that are attributable to discrimination,
such as restrictions on access into certain occupations and direct em-
ployer wage discrimination, combine with non-discriminatory factors,
such as differences between men and women in the amount of time
worked, to create an earnings gap between men and women.1 0 In the
United States, these factors are incorporated into the wage structure
through the private decisions of hundreds of employers. This makes it
very difficult to isolate the influence of particular factors, such as sex
discrimination, on the wage gap.
In Australia, a centralized wage-setting process formalizes some of
the factors that influence wages and incorporates them into the wage
structure. Significantly for our purposes, until 1969 sex discrimination
was one of the factors which was formalized and incorporated into the
wage structure through the centralized wage-setting process. Then,
from 1969 to 1975, sex discrimination was removed from the wage-set-
ting process. Australia is a good comparator country, then, because
the differences between its wage-setting processes and those in the
United States makie it possible, first, to isolate the influence of sex
discrimination on wage rates prior to 1969 and, second, to trace the
effects of eliminating that sex discrimination.
The comparison is enlightening in a number of ways. First, it pro-
vides an estimate of the extent to which women's wages in the United
9. R.G. Gregory et al., Women's Pay in Australia, Great Britain, and the United
States: The Role of Laws, Regulations, and Human Capital, in PAY EQuTy: EM-
PIicAJ.. INQunuEs 222, 238-39 (Robert Michael et al. eds., 1989).
10. The dichotomy between discriminatory and non-discriminatory factors, of course,
is not a clear one. Discriminatory factors may be based on malicious employer
intent, or they may be based on employer attempts to maximize productivity
where group productivity is known and information on individual productivity is
costly. See Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62
Am. EcoN. REv. 659 (1972). Non-discriminatory factors, such as differences in
hours worked, may be based on the voluntary decisions of women, or they may
reflect the discriminatory decisions of employers to offer fewer hours of work to
women. Paul Weiler, The Wages of Se= The Uses and Limits of Comparable
Worth, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1728, 1781 (1986).
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States are depressed by discrimination. The estimate-that about one-
third of the wage gap between men and women is caused by discrimi-
nation-avoids the problems of similar estimates that are based only
on the experience of the United States. Second, the comparison sheds
an unflattering light on the dominant theoretical framework that is
used to analyze wage issues-the human capital model. Institutions
and rigidities in the labor market matter much more than the human
capital model would admit. Alternative theoretical models are needed
to understand wage issues better and to provide better guidance to
those making policy decisions about wages or, indeed, about any type
of intervention in the labor market. Third, the comparison helps to
identify the elements of a successful public program designed to deal
with women's wages. If the United States ever decides to make an
effort to address this type of discrimination, the Australian experience
instructs us on how to structure the program.
The article first provides a detailed description of the wage-setting
process in Australia and the history of women's wages within that pro-
cess. The article then compares the Australian experience with that
of the United States. The doctrines designed to deal with women's
wages in the two countries are compared, the inference from the Aus-
tralian experience that discrimination is a significant factor depressing
women's wages in the United States is subjected to rigorous economic
analysis, and finally the lessons of the Australian experience for the
United States are discussed.
II. WOMEN'S WAGES IN AUSTRALIA
The Australian system of industrial relations is very different from
the American system. Several of the central tenets of labor law in the
United States are not present in Australia. Selection of union repre-
sentatives through majority vote of the employees to be represented,'"
employer recognition of unions,12 and non-involvement of the state in
setting wages and other substantive terms of employment' 3 are all
central principles of American labor law. None are present in Austra-
lia. A thorough comparative evaluation of the industrial relations sys-
tems of the two countries,14 then, would be of value.15 In this article,
11. National Labor Relations Act, § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)(1988).
12. National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)(1988).
13. Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard,
67 NEB. L. REv. 7, 9-11 (1988).
14. We have been unable to find any comparative studies in the mainstream of Amer-
ican legal literature, although there have been a few comparative studies pub-
lished elsewhere, see, eg., Nicholas Blain et al., Mediation, Conciliation and
Arbitration: An International Comparison of Australia, Great Britain and the
United States, 126 INT'L LAB. REv. 179 (1987); M. Derber, Reflections on Aspects
of the Australian and American Systems of Industrial Relations, in PERSPEC.
TIVES ON AUSTRALIAN INDusTRIAL RELATIONS 20 (W.A. Howard ed., 1984), and a
WOMEN'S WAGES
however, we have a narrower concern. We are concerned with the
manner in which the Australian wage-setting process first contributed
to the creation of significant disparities between female and male
earnings and then, over a period of years, operated to narrow them.
A. The Wage-Setting Process
State and federal industrial tribunals in Australia have the power
to issue awards which set minimum rates of pay and other minimum
terms of employment.16 As will be discussed in this section, even
though the awards only establish minimum standards and employees
may seek "overaward" pay from their employers, the tribunals have a
number of articles that describe Australian labor relations practices for an Amer-
ican audience without making a concerted comparative effort. See Richard
Mitchell & Malcolm Rimmer, Labour Law, Deregulation, and Flexibility in Aus-
tralian Industrial Relations, 12 COMP. LAB. L.J. 1 (1990); J.E. Isaac & RC. Mc-
Callum, The Role of Neutrals in the Resolution of Interest Disputes in Australia,
10 ComP. LAB. L.J. 300 (1989); George Strauss, Australian Labor Relations
Through American Eyes, 27 INDUS. REL. 131 (1988); Whitfield, The Australian
Wage System and Its Labor Market Fffects, 27 INDUS. REL. 149 (1988); Stephen J.
Frenkel, Australian Employers in the Sht2dow of the Labor Accords, 27 INDUS.
REL. 166 (1988). The economists have done a better job, but their comparative
studies, as one would expect, have focused on the economic effects of the respec-
tive systems rather than on the industrial relations systems themselves. See, eg.,
Daniel J.B. Mitchell, The Australian Labor Market, in THE AUSTRALIAN ECON-
OmY: A VIEW FROM THE NoRTH 127 (Richard E. Caves & Lawrence B. Krause eds.,
1984); ROBERT G. GREGORY & VIVIAN Ho, EQUAL PAY AND COMPARABLE WORTH:
WHAT CAN THE U.S. LEARN FROM THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE, (Australian Na-
tional University, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No.
123, July 1985).
15. A principal value of comparative law is that it causes one to re-examine the cen-
tral premises of one's own system of law. Clyde Summers, Worker Participation
in Sweden and the United States Some Comparisons from an American Perspec-
tive, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 175, 176 (1984). A comparison of the Australian and
American systems of industrial relations would contribute to this process in large
part because the two systems differ significantly on central premises, some of
which are under reconsideration in the United States. See, e.g., Employment
Rights Symposium, 67 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1988)(discussing the premise that the state
should not be involved in setting the substantive terms of employment); Paul
Weler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983)(questioning union selection procedures).
16. The federal government and all the states, except the Northern Territory, have
industrial tribunals with wage-setting responsibilities. For the federal govern-
ment, the basic act is the Industrial Relations Act 1988, which replaced the vener-
able Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904. For the states, the basic acts are the
Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 (New South Wales); Industrial Conciliation and
Arbitration Act (Queensland); Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1972
(South Australia); Industrial Relations Act 1975 (Tasmania); Industrial Relations
Act 1979 (Victoria); and Industrial Arbitration Act 1979 (Western Australia). For
a general introduction to the acts, see PETER PuNcH, GUIDEBOOK TO AUSTRALIAN
INDUSTRIAL LAW 483-533 (4th ed. 1984).
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great influence on wage rates in Australia and, as a result, on the rela-
tive earnings of men and women.
Although the mere existence of industrial tribunals with the
power to set wages and other terms of employment is strange to
American observers,17 the initial establishment of the'tribunals is cer-
tainly understandable as an historical phenomenon.' 8 The tribunals
were formed at the turn of the century as a direct consequence of the
Great Strikes of the 1890s.19 Labor suffered humiliating and over-
whelming defeats during this period.20 In retrospect, the losses seem
almost inevitable. Since the strikes occurred during a severe reces-
sion, replacement labor was readily available; the unions had very lim-
ited resources; and, as in the United States at that time, the unions had
to battle the police and the courts, as well as employers. Labor's losses
convinced it of the need for political as well as economic action and
resulted in the formation of the Labor Party in the early 1890s.21 The
losses also convinced labor, although with some reluctance, of the
need'for governmental arbitration of labor disputes.22 At the same
time, the Great Strikes created public sentiment favorable to labor's
position. The strikes caused massive public disruption23 and the pub-
17. One observer has commented that Australian industrial relations is "as exotic as
the boomerang or the kangaroo." K.F. Walker, The Development of Australian
Industrial Relations in International Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON AusTRA-
LIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 1 (W.A. Howard ed., 1984).
18. For a good brief discussion of the historical context, see S. DEERY & D. PLOWMAN,
AusTRALiAN INDusTRIAL RELATIONS 66-70 (2d ed. 1985). For a longer discussion
see J.T. SuTCLIFFE, A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONIsM IN AUsTRALIA 90-238
(1921)(Reissue 1967).
19. The critical part played by the Great Strikes in all this needs little em-
phasis. If these strikes had not occurred and if unionism and collective
bargaining had been allowed to become more firmly established, as they
showed every sign of doing in the 1880s, the course of Australian indus-
trial relations might well have been different.... It is probably not an
exaggeration to say that the character of Australian industrial relations
was shaped by the strikes of the 1890s.
JOSEPH IsAAc & BiLL FORD, Introduction to Part IV, Industrial Regulation and
Collective Bargaining, AUSTRALIAN LAB. REL. READINGS 324-25 (Joseph Isaac &
Bill Ford eds., 2d ed. 1971).
20. For vivid accounts of these strikes, see BRIAN FITZPATRICK, SHORT HISTORY OF
THE AUsTRALIAN LABOR MOVEMENT 123-44 (1968) and GEORGE DALE, THE INDUS-
TRIAL HISTORY OF BROKEN HILL 9-85 (1918).
21. SUTcLIFFE, supra note 18, at 126-46; Edward I. Sykes, Labour Arbitration in Aus-
tralia, in AUSTRALIAN LAB. REL. READINGS, supra note 19, at 353; Walker, supra
note 17, at 4. See also DEERY & PLOWMAN, supra note 18, at 66-70, 203-04.
22. R. Gollan, The Historical Perspective, in AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNIONS: THEIR DE-
VELOPMENT, STRUcTuRE AND HORIZONs 27-28 (S. Matthews & James Ford eds.,
1968); Walker, supra note 17, at 4; Sykes, supra note 21, at 353.
23. Never before [the Great Strikes] had there been a strike covering such a
wide area of industry and lasting so long. Consumers were deprived of
their accustomed conveniences; transport was disorganized; in Adelaide
and Melbourne the strike resulted in a shortage of gas in private homes.
[Vol. 71:581
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lic viewed strong governmental intervention as a reasonable way of
preventing such strikes in the future.24 Labor's political success, en-
hanced by the favorable public sentiment, resulted in industrial tribu-
nals in all the states and, after formation of the Commonwealth of
Australia in 1901,25 in the federal government as well. The Concilia-
tion and Arbitration Act of 1904 established a federal industrial tribu-
nal with the power to compel hearings on labor disputes and, if the
dispute could not be settled voluntarily, to issue legally binding arbi-
tration awards. Alfred Deakin, one of the principal drafters of the
new legislation, made a statement at the time that is reminiscent in its
goals and optimistic tone, if not in its central policy, of statements
made by Robert Wagner in 1935:
We now substitute a new regime for the reign of violence by endowing the
State... with power to impose within the limits of reason, justice, and consti-
tutional government, its deliberate will upon the parties to industrial
disputes.26
The basic procedure used to resolve industrial disputes under cur-
rent federal law27 is relatively straightforward.25 The Australian In-
It also meant unemployment as various establishments were forced to
close down through lack of materials.
J.H. PORTus, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIAN TRADE UNION LAW 102-03
(1958).
24. DEERY & PLOWMAN, supra note 18, at 68; Walker, supra note 17, at 4; Sykes,
supra note 21, at 353.
25. The Great Strikes were particularly influential because they occurred during the
deliberations of a series of constitutional conventions. JOHN NILAND, COLLECIVE
BARGAINING AND COMPULSORY ARBITRATION IN AUSTRALIA 22-23 (1978). Section
51(xxxv) of the Constitution granted the Federal Parliament power to make laws
"with respect to conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of
industrial disputes extending beyond the limit of any one state." AusTL. CONST.
§ 51(xxxv).
26. MARK PERLMAN, JUDGES IN INDUSTRY 13 (1954). Compare Mr. Deakin's state-
ment to the following statement by Senator Wagner.
[The Wagner Act] is responsive to the serious industrial disturbances
of last summer, when blood ran freely in the streets and martial law was
in the offing.... In its search for industrial peace combined with eco-
nomic justice, [the Wagner Act] appeals to the conscience and intelli-
gence of all those who know the history of our country and are imbued
with its high ideals. In applying the healing balm of an upright, impar-
tial, and peaceful forum to industry and labor it will benefit employers,
workers, and the country at large.
79 CONG. REC. S7573 (daily ed. May 15, 1935).
27. Because the federal tribunal has disproportionate influence, and for clarity, this
article will focus on the federal wage-setting system. DAVID H. PLOWMAN LT AL.,
AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 117-21 (Rev. ed. 1980).
28. The Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1904 was repealed and replaced in 1988
by the Industrial Relations Act of 1988. Although there were a number of techni-
cal changes made, the overall structure of the industrial relations system remains
the same under the new act. Isaac & McCallum, supra note 14, at 301 n.3. In-
deed, proposed amendments to the 1988 Act that would have resulted in more
basic changes to the industrial relations system (for example, amendments that
1992]
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dustrial Relations Commission (the Commission)29 is notified when a
labor dispute arises.30 If the Commission has jurisdiction,31 it first at-
tempts to conciliate. The Act directs the Commission to "do every-
thing that appears... to be right and proper to assist the parties to
agree on terms for the prevention or settlement of the industrial dis-
pute."3 2 If an agreement cannot be reached through conciliation, the
would have created movement away from occupation-based unions towards en-
terprise-based unions and that would have strengthened the ability of employers
to enforce no-strike clauses) were defeated. J.E. Stackpool, Industrial Relations
Legislation in 1988, 31 J. INDUS. REL 93, 96 (1989). For a good brief review of the
changes made by the Industrial Relations Act 1988, see Reg Hamilton, The New
Federal Industrial Relations Act, 26 L. Soc'Y J. 52 (1988).
29. Under the original Act, the Commission was known as the "Commonwealth
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration." In 1956, the Court was divided into two
tribunals, the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission which
exercises conciliation and arbitration powers under the Act and the Common-
wealth Industrial Court (later replaced by the Federal Court-Industrial Divi-
sion) which exercises judicial powers. Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1956, No.
44, 1956 AusTL. ACTs P. 476. In 1974, the word "Commonwealth" in the name of
the Commission was replaced with "Australian." The 1988 Act instituted the cur-
rent name. Industrial Relations Act, No. 86, 1988 AuSTL. ACTS P. 1353, § 8. For
convenience, this article will always refer to the body with conciliation and arbi-
tration powers as the "Commission."
The Commission consists of a President, a number of Deputy Presidents (cur-
rently 4), and a number of Commissioners (currently 30). Industrial Relations
Act, No. 86, 1988 AusTL. ACTS P. 1353, § 8. The President must be legally quali-
fied, id. at § 10(1); the Deputy Presidents need not be legally qualified, but usu-
ally are, id. at § 10(2); and the Commissioners are not usually legally qualified,
but are persons who have considerable experience in labor relations. Id. at
§ 10(3). See PLOWMA ET AL, supra note 27, at 122-23. Except in quite limited
circumstances (§§ 24, 28 of Industrial Relations Act 1988), members of the Com-
mission may not be removed from office, although they are required to retire at
age 65. Id. at § 16. Depending on the dispute, the Commission operates through
single members or through a panel of three members, known as a '"ull Bench."
Id. at § 30. A Full Bench has original jurisdiction over certain cases of national
importance, id. at § 106; appellate jurisdiction over decisions by single members
of the Commission, id. at § 45; and reference jurisdiction on matters which are
before a single member, but which the President considers ought to be heard by a
Full Bench. Id. at § 107.
30. Id. at § 99.
31. The primary jurisdictional prerequisites to Commission action are that the dis-
pute be in an "industry," see, e.g., R. v. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion Commission; ex parte Association of Professional Engineers, 107 C.L.R. 208
(1959) R. v. Holmes; ex parte Public Service Ass'n of New South Wales, 140 C.LR.
63 (1977), that the dispute concern an "industrial matter," see, e.g., R. v. Portus; ex
parte Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd., 127 C.L.R. 353 (1972); R. v.
Judges of the Commonwealth Industrial Court; ex parte Cocks, 121 C.L.R. 313
(1968), and that the dispute be "interstate." Caledonian Collieries Ltd. v. Austra-
lia Coal & Shale Employees' Federation, 42 C.L.R. 527 (1930); R. v. Common-
wealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; en parte Australian Workers'
Union, 99 C.L.R. 505 (1957).
32. Industrial Relations Act, No. 86, 1988 AusTL. Acts P. 1353, § 102.
[Vol. 71:581
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Commission then arbitrates the dispute.3 3 The arbitration proceeding
itself resembles American interests arbitration. In conducting the
proceeding, the Commission "is not bound to act in a formal manner
and is not bound by any rules of evidence, but may inform itself on
any matter in such manner as it considers just"3 4 and "shall act ac-
cording to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities and legal forms."3 5 The arbitra-
tion award is binding on the parties.3 6
The relatively simple procedure, originally designed primarily to
prevent and settle industrial disputes,3 7 has evolved over time and for
a number of reasons into a complex and largely centralized wage-set-
ting process. The national scope of certain issues addressed by the
Commission was a major factor that led to the increased complexity
and centralization. On issues such as the minimum rate of pay,3 8 an
increase earned by one union to settle a dispute was likely to create
dozens of new disputes as other unions attempted to match the in-
crease. Since the Commission's mission was to prevent, not to create,
industrial disputes, it became important for the Commission to resolve
these national issues uniformly and simultaneously. National wage
cases were the medium developed to do this.39
The conceptual framework developed by the Commission early in
its history to resolve wage disputes also contributed to the momentum
toward a centralized wage-setting process. In three cases decided be-
tween 1907 and 1909,40 Mr. Justice Higgins, an influential early Presi-
33. Id. at § 104.
34. Id at § 310(2)(b)
35. Id. at § 110(2)(c).
36. Id. at § 149. Although the awards are formally designated as binding and the Act
provides penalties for failure to comply with an award, §§ 178-86, as a practical
matter, penalties do not exist. DAVID H. PLOWMAN, WAGE INDEXATION: A STUDY
OF AUSTRALIAN WAGE IssuEs 1975-1980 at 14-16 (1981); PLOwMAN T AL., supra
note 27, at 239-42. As a result, in practice the awards establish minimum stan-
dards and the overaward process is allowed to operate.
37. The "objects" section of the Act speaks directly of preventing and settling indus-
trial disputes in four of its eight subsections. Industrial Relations Act, No. 86,
1988 AusTL. ACTS P. 1353, §§ 3(a)-(d). The other subsections list as objects pro-
viding for the enforcement of agreements and awards, id at § 3(e); encouraging
the formation and registration of unions and employer organizations, id. at § 3(f);
and encouraging democratic control of unions and employer organizations, id. at
§ 3(g). Setting wages is not mentioned in the objects section of the current Act
and, indeed, was mentioned in only one section of the original act and that men-
tion was only as an incident to the prevention and settlement of industrial dis-
putes. Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1904, § 2(d).
38. Other issues, such as hours of work, vacation leave, and sick leave, were also na-
tional in scope.
39. National wage cases are discussed later in this article. See infra notes 58-61 and
accompanying text.
40. Harvester Judgment, 2 C.A.R. 1 (1907); Marine Cooks, 2 C.A.R. 55 (1908); Broken
Hill, 3 C.A.R. 1 (1909). Ironically, the seminal case, Harvester Judgment, did not
1992]
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dent of the Commission,41 developed the concepts of a "basic wage"
and "margins." The basic wage was to be incorporated into every
wage-setting award as a minimum. It was the wage necessary for "the
normal needs of the average employee, regarded as a human being
living in a civilized community." 42 Margins, or secondary wages, were
the amounts added to the basic wage to remunerate a worker "for
such skill or other exceptional necessary qualifications as are required
for his occupation, and as lift him above the level of the unskilled
labourer."43 The basic wage, then, led to centralization because it pro-
vided a common foundation for the entire wage structure conceptual-
ized by the Commission.44 By 1922, a process had been developed to
determine the basic wage on a national basis.45 By the time the basic
wage concept was discarded in 1967,46 a centralized wage-setting pro-
involve an industrial dispute. Instead, it was decided under the Excise Tariff Act
of 1906, No. 16, 5 Ausm. AcTs P. 59, which imposed duties on certain imported
goods to protect Australian manufacturers from foreign competition. To insure
that some of the benefits of this protection reached employees, the Act provided
that domestic manufacturers would also be required to pay the duties unless the
manufacturers could produce a certificate showing that they paid "fair and rea-
sonable" wages. Id at § 2(d), 5 Ausm. AcTs P. 59, 60 (1906). The Commission,
was one of the bodies which could issue these certificates. Id Justice Higgins
first developed the basic wage concept to determine whether he should issue such
a certificate. Even more ironically, the Excise Tariff Act of 1906 was later de-
dared unconstitutional. R. v. Barger, 6 C.L.R. 41 (1908). In Marine Cooks, Hig-
gins first applied the basic wage concept to a case arising under the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act and, in Broken Hill, he first declared the basic wage to be an
irreducible minimum:
For this purpose, it is advisable to make the demarcation as clear and as
definite as possible between that part of wages which is for mere living,
and that part of wages which is due to skill, or to monopoly, or to other
considerations. Unless great multitudes of people are to be irretrievably
injured in themselves and in their families, unless society is to be perpet-
ually in industrial unrest, it is necessary to keep this living wage as a
thing sacrosanct, beyond the reach of bargaining.
Broken Hill, 3 C.A.R. 1, 32 (1909).
41. Mr. Justice Higgins was President of the Commission from 1907-1921. For a dis-
cussion of his influence, see PERLMAN, supra note 26.
42. Harvester Judgment, 2 C.A.R. 1, 3 (1907).
43. Gas Employees Case, 13 C.A.R. 437, 461 (1919). In addition to skill, Boot Trades
Case, 4 C.A.R. 1, 10-11 (1909), margins were awarded for other requirements of
the job such as responsibility (Federated Gas Employees Case, 48 C.A.R. 895, 903-
04 (1942)); care (Federated Carters and Drivers' Industrial Union Case, 11 C.A.R.
336, 349-50 (1917)); alertness (Australian Railways Case, 23 C.A.R. 708, 745-47
(1926)); and supervisory responsibilities (Woolclassers Case, 38 C.A.R. 68, 69
(1937)).
44. "[Ihe basic wage is foundational to every wage fixed by every award." Austra-
lian Theatrical and Amusement Employees, 62 C.A.R. 464, 468 (1948).
45. See J. Hu'rON, SIX WAGE CONCEPTs 7-8 (1971); PLOWMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at
253-54.
46. The basic wage and margins concept was replaced in 1967 with a single total wage,
1967 National Wage Case, 118 C.A.R. 655, 658-60 (1967), undergirded by a previ-
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cess was firmly entrenched.
The process of union recognition and the structure of union organi-
zation are other factors that led to centralization. Unions achieve rec-
ognition in Australia not by campaigning for majority support of a
particular employer's workers, 47 but by defining a segment of the
workforce that is not currently represented.48 Since most unions in
Australia are craft unions, these segments of the workforce are usu-
ally defined in term of skills or occupation rather than by employer.49
Stated another way, unions in Australia generally seek to represent
persons who work at a common occupation, even though they may be
employed by a number of employers.5 0 If an unrepresented segment
of the workforce can be identified, recognition comes not from em-
ployers, but from the arbitration system itself.51 Once recognized, a
union may submit wage claims for employees within the identified
segment, even against employers who do not employ any union mem-
bers.5 2 This structure and process creates few incentives for unions
and employers to establish close working relationships at the individ-
ual employer level. Instead, centralization is encouraged because the
salient contacts between unions and employers are made through or-
ganizations, rather than directly, and at state or national, rather than
local, levels.53 Centralization of the wage-setting process is also en-
couraged because this structure has resulted in a high degree of union-
ization (union workers constituted 54 percent of the workforce in
1989,54 compared with 16 percent in the United States)55 and an even
higher proportion of the workforce having wages covered by a Com-
ously established minimum wage. Basic Wage Margins and Total Wage Cases of
1966, 115 C.A.R. 93 (1966).
47. That, of course, is the primary method of obtaining recognition in the United
States. For an important critique of this process, see Weiler, supra note 15.
48. Although there are other prerequisites to union registration under the Act, see
Reg. 115, AUsTL. STAT. R. CONSOL. (1986), the most frequently raised objection is
that the persons the union seeks to represent are already represented by another,
registered union or, more precisely, that the members of the union seeking regis-
tration might "conveniently belong" to another union which has already been
registered. Industrial Relations Act, No. 86,1988 AUSTL. ACTs P. 1353, § 189; Reg.
119(2)(c), AUsTL. STAT. R. CONSOL. (1986). There is no requirement in Australia
that the union seeking registration have majority support of the employees it
seeks to represent.
49. D.W. RAWSON, UNIONS AND UNIoNISTs IN AUSTRALA 37-41 (2d ed. 1986); David H.
Plowman, The Settlement of Industrial Disputes in Australia, in INDUSTRIAL
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN MARKET ECONOMIES 23, 32-33 (Tadashi Hanami ed.,
1984).
50. See generally PLOWMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 190-205.
51. Industrial Relations Act, No. 86, 1988 AUSTL. AcTs P. 1353, § 191; Reg. 125-26,
AusTL. STAT. R. CONSOL. (1986).
52. Mitchell, supra note 14, at 174.
53. PLOWMAN ET AL, supra note 27, at 199-205; Mitchell, supra note 14, at 174.
54. AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 1989 LABouR STATISTICS AUSTRALIA 119
(ABS Cat. No. 6101.0). As in the United States, Australia's unionization rate for
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mission award or other union-influenced wage resolution (85 percent
in 1985,56 compared with 16 percent in the United States whose wages
were covered by collective bargaining agreements).57
All of these pressures to centralize, and others, have molded the
relatively simple, basic procedure of the Act into a complex three-
tiered system for determining wages. National wage cases make up
the first tier of the system. In these cases, five to seven members of
the Commission58 articulate and apply national wage-setting princi-
ples through a test case, the results of which are then widely applied.59
Although the precise criteria relied upon by the Commission to estab-
lish wages in National wage cases have varied over the years, in gen-
eral terms the Commission has always sought some accommodation
between maintaining the real value of the basic wage (often by raising
wages in relation to a consumer price index) and limiting wage in-
creases to the economy's capacity to pay (based on an assessment of
national productivity).60 As one would expect, the extent of Commis-
sion influence on actual wage rates through national cases has varied
over the years, but even at their weakest, national cases have a far
greater influence than any single wage-setting mechanism in the
United States.6 '
Industry awards make up the second tier of the system. The name,
however, is a bit of a misnomer. Because of the structure of union
organization,6 2 the awards at this level, with very few exceptions, are
based on occupation, not on industry. The awards (or wage-setting de-
cisions of the Commission) are "industry" awards not because they ap-
ply only to a particular industry, but because most of the workers in
an occupation are often found in one industry.6 3 Thus, the Transport
Workers' Award is the "industry" award for the transport industry
men (62 percent) is higher than the rate for women (44 percent). I& See infra
note 55.
55. DIRECTORY OF U.S. LABOR ORGANIzATIONs, 1990-91 EDITION 5 (Courtney D. Gif-
ford ed., 1988). The unionization rate was 20 percent for men and 13 percent for
women. Id
56. AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 1989 LABOUR STATISTICS AUSTRALIA 42, 120
(ABS Cat. No. 6101.0). Eighty-seven percent of women and 83 percent of men
were covered. Id
57. DIRECTORY OF U.S. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, 1990-91 EDITION, supra note 55, at 65.
Twenty-two percent of men were covered, while 15 percent of women were cov-
ered. (These statistics are for 1989.) Id.
58. PUNCH, supra note 16, at 149.
59. DEERY & PLOWMAN, supra note 18, at 290.
60. Id. at 286-304. PLOWMAN, supra note 36, at 7-10.
61. F.P. Nieuwenhuysen, The Wage Indexation Eaperiment, in PERSPECTIVES ON
AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 149, 154-55 (W. Howard ed., 1984)(national
wage cases contribution to overall increases in award rates from 1968-80 ranged
from 19 percent in 1974 to 97-99 percent in 1978).
62. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
63. DEERY & PLOWMAN, supra note 18, at 320-21.
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since most truck drivers are found in that industry, but truck drivers
who are employed in other industries (e.g., drivers who are employed
by a brewery rather than a trucking company) are also covered by the
award. Truck drivers, then, are covered by the same award rate of
pay64 regardless of their employer.65 Employers, in turn, are governed
by a variety of awards. At the Australian National University, for ex-
ample, there are forty-two different award rates of pay for the admin-
istrative and clerical staffs alone.66
The criteria used by the Commission to make industry awards are
of special interest in the equal pay context.67 The national wage cases
are the primary mechanisms for making general wage adjustments to
maintain living standards or to distribute broad productivity increases
or declines.68 The industry cases are primarily directed to maintaining
or adjusting the wage relativities between occupations 69 -the relativi-
64. Despite this, because the award rates of pay are minima and workers can seek
over-awards, the actual rates of pay of truck drivers may vary. See infra notes 79-
82 and accompanying text.
65. This notion-that the rate of pay should not depend on the particular employer-
is captured in one of the central principles of wage determination at the indus-
trial level, the principle of comparative wage justice. See infra notes 71-75 and
accompanying text.
66. R.G. Gregory & R. Anstie, Equal Pay in Australia: Can Women Do Better Than
88 Cents in the Hourly Male Dollar?, Paper presented at Pacific Rim Compara-
tive Labour Policy Conference, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Can-
ada, 6 (June 24 & 25, 1987). See also Strauss, supra note 14, at 138 (in chemical
industry, average firm deals with 14.9 different unions; in gas, electric and water
industry, average firm deals with 16.3 different unions).
67. For a more detailed discussion of the relevance of these criteria to the equal pay
debate, see infra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
68. This is certainly true during periods in which the National Wage Cases are de-
cided under principles which index wage increases to increases in the cost of liv-
ing. See Nieuweuhuysen, supra note 61, at 154-55 (during indexation from 1976-
80, 97-99 percent of all increases in award wages were attributable to National
Wage Cases). However, as one would expect in such a complex and dynamic
wage-setting system, there have been periods when the influence of National
Wage Cases was much less. From 1967-74, for example, National Wage Cases,
although still perhaps the single most important mechanism for making general
wage adjustments, contributed only 19-40 percent of the overall increase in award
wage increases. DEERY & PLOwmAN, supra note 18, at 298. Even more dramati-
cally, there was a short period from August 1981 to December 1982, during which
there were no increases granted through National Wage Cases, but there were
substantial increases in award rates through other mechanisms. DEERY & PLOW-
MAN, supra note 18, at 307-08; PUNCH, supra note 16, at 304-08.
69. The National Wage Cases are also concerned, in part and to a degree that varies,
with wage relativities between occupations. The Equal Pay Cases are principal
examples of National Wage Cases affecting relativities. For a discussion of the
Equal Pay Cases, see infra notes 124-68 and accompanying text. The National
Wage Cases also often explicitly incorporate a work value component that is pri-
marily concerned with relativities between occupations. See, e.g., National Wage
Case 1987, 17 I.R. 65 (1987); National Wage Case 1983, 291 C.A.R. 3, 52 (1983). See
discussion infra at notes 76-78.
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ties that are at the heart of the comparable worth debate.
Two principal criteria used by the Commission in industry cases
are comparative wage justice and work value.7 0 Comparative wage
justice requires that "employees doing the same work for different
employers or in different industries should by and large receive the
same amount of pay irrespective of the capacity of their employer or
industry."71 The "same work," for purposes of comparative wage jus-
tice, has not been narrowly construed to mean virtually identical
work. Rather, work can be the "same" if it requires similar levels of
training, skill, and responsibility. The fitters' job classification pro-
vides a good example:
The fitters' classification... soon became [a major] benchmark [for pur-
poses of comparative wage justice] because fitters were employed in a wide
range of industries, and because it could be extended to other classifications
which required the same degree of skill and training: millers, borers, slotters,
gear cutters, cutting bar drillers, lappers, precision grinders, brass finishers,
turners, boiler-makers and metal moulders. In other industries the fitter's
rate was applied to tradesmen such as carpenters, coopers, tailors, printing
compositors, butchers and so on. Members of the [Commission] argued that
those trades required periods of apprenticeship and training and a degree of
manual skill similar to that of the fitter. The establishment of [fitters' rates in
an] award in turn provided a benchmark by which the marginal relativities of
other classifications within that award could be fixed.7 2
Under comparative wage justice, then, job classifications were com-
pared to one another based on the training, skill, and responsibility
required to do them and those comparisons were then translated into
wage relativities between the occupations. Over time the comparative
wage justice criterion created an intricate and strongly interrelated
system of pay relativities between occupations. 73 In practice the crite-
rion meant that an increase in any job classification would likely lead
to increases in other, comparable job classifications. 74 Or, as it was
more colorfully stated, the wage system operating under the principle
was "a huge jelly-touch it anywhere and it trembles to its farthest
70. The Commission also uses other criteria to decide industry cases. See generally
RAYMOND O'DEA, PRINCIPLES OF WAGE DETERMINATION IN COMMONWEALTH AR-
BrrRATION (1969); HUTSON, supra note 45, at 136-51.
71. Engineering Oil Industry Case, 134 C.A.R. 159, 165 (1970).
72. DEERY & PLOWMAN, supra note 18, at 336.
73. 1& at 336-37.
74. The criterion of comparative wage justice was popular with the trade
unions because it was a way of transmitting [a gain] obtained in one
award across a number of other awards, and so enabled them to obtain
the same [gain] for jobs with similar characteristics. They developed
considerable ingenuity in drawing parallels between classifications,
while the hunting down of anomalies became, and remains, a popular
sport with them. The rank and file also watched their relativities like a
hawk.
HUTSON, supra note 45, at 145.
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corner." 75
The work value criterion for making industry awards is the flip
side of comparative wage justice.7 6 Comparative wage justice is used
to maintain wage relativities that have been established based on the
training, skill, and responsibility of the jobs. For example, if Jobs 1
and 2 are the "same" and have historically been paid the same wage
and then the wages for Job 1 are increased, the incumbents of Job 2
would likely seek an equivalent increase under the comparative wage
justice criterion.7 7 Work value is used to change relativities when the
requirements of a job change.7 8 Thus, if there is an important change
in the duties of Job 1, its incumbents might seek a wage increase based
on the work value criterion that would break Job l's historical wage
relationship with Job 2.
Over-awards make up the third tier of the system.7 9 Awards by
the Commission are minima8 0 and employees can seek more from
their employers than the Commission awards. Over-awards allow the
wage-setting system to be fine-tuned. Employees who work for espe-
cially profitable employers may use the over-award mechanism to ob-
tain some of the benefits of the extra profitability. Similarly,
employers who are experiencing special difficulty in attracting labor
may agree to over-award pay in an attempt to deal with that prob-
lem.1 Less justifiably, perhaps, over-awards permit strong unions to
75. Report of the Royal Commission on Industrial Arbitration in New South Wales,
297 New South Wales Parliamentary Papers, 2nd Sess., Ixvi (1913), as cited in,
Walker, supra note 17, at 6.
76. There is, in fact, little distinction between comparative wage justice and work
value other than the different circumstances in which the claims are forwarded.
Andrew Portus, Inter-Industry Award Fixation Under the Commonwealth Act,
11 J. INDUS. REL. 201, 201, 206 (1969); O'DEA, supra note 70, at 153-61.
77. DEERY & PLOWMAN, supra note 18, at 337.
78. See, ag., National Wage Case 1987,17 I.R. 65 (1987); National Wage Case 1983, 291
C.A.R. 3, 52 (1983).
79. Over-award payments can take many forms, ranging from flat amounts paid to
everyone working in a particular occupation at an establishment to amounts that
are tied to some measure of productivity, such as length-of-service or attendance.
W. Brown, Wage Drift in the Australian Metal Industries Revisited, in PERSPEC-
TIVES ON AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 140, 142-43 (W.A. Howard ed.,
1984).
80. In theory, Commission awards are not minima The Act provides legal authority
for the enforcement of awards. The penalties include fines and deregistration of
unions or union members. Industrial Relations Act, No. 86, 1988 Ausm. ACTS P.
1353, §§ 178, 294, 311. In practice, however, the awards are treated as minima and
unions are seldom sanctioned for seeking over-awards. DEERY & PLOWMAN,
supra note 18, at 274-76, 278-81. See generally PUNCH, supra note 16, at 231-49.
For a brief history, see RAWSON, supra note 49, at 100-05. Amendments to the
1988 Bill which would have strengthened the ability of the Commission to enforce
its awards were defeated. See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 56-57.
81. DEERY & PLOWMAN, supra note 18, at 330.
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exert their influence.8 2
Despite the existence of over-awards, the extent of governmental
influence on wages in Australia is very great, certainly compared with
the extent of governmental influence on wages in the United States.8 3
The award system directly regulates the wages of 86 percent of all em-
ployees in Australia.8 4 The coverage is very high in every industry85
and in all occupations.8 6 The arbitration system also exerts a signifi-
cant, but difficult to measure, influence on the wages of employees
whose wages are not directly regulated by the system-all wage-set-
ting in Australia takes place in the shadow of the arbitration system.
The influence of over-awards, although not insignificant, is not too
great. Most workers in Australia, for example all public servants and
all university employees, receive only the award rate of pay. Most
workers do not receive any over-award payments.8 7 As a result, over-
award payments in the aggregate do not significantly affect earnings.
In 1985, only 3 percent of the average weekly earnings of males and 2
percent of the average weekly earnings of females were attributable to
over-award payments.8 8 More importantly for our purposes, although
82. AUsTRALIAN LABOUR EcoNoMIcs: READINGS 113 (J.R. Niland & J.E. Isaac eds.,
new ed. 1975). But see J.E. Isaac, Wage Drift in the Australian Metal Industries,
in AusrRALAN LABOUR EcoNoMIcs: READINGs, supra, at 141, 144 (few employ-
ers surveyed attributed over-award pay to trade union pressure).
83. It is... likely that the proportion of wage rises [from 1945-46 to 1958-59]
due to award variations was greater than 77 per cent, but somewhat less
than 100 per cent.... The behavior of wages and prices is predomi-
nantly, though not entirely, the result of the decisions of the tribunals.
R. Hancock, Wages Policy and Price Stability in Australia, 1953-60, 70 ECON. J.
543, 545-50 (1960). For a more recent assessment, see Brown, supra note 79, at
145-48 (influence of tribunals on actual earnings fluctuates from 1955 to 1982, but
the influence is always significant).
84. That is, the rates of pay and conditions of work of 86 percent of all employees in
Australia are normally varied in accordance with variations in awards or determi-
nations made by state or federal commissions in collective agreements registered
with state or local commissions, or in specific unregistered collective agreements
(not including agreements dealing only with over-award pay). AUsTRALIAN Bu-
REAU OF STATISTICS, INCIDENCE OF INDUSTRIAL AwARDs, DETERMINATIONS AND
CoLLEcTcvE AGREEMENTS, MAY 1983 (ABS Cat. No. 6315.0), at 6, Table 2 (1985).
85. In wholesale trade, the industry with the lowest proportion of employees covered
by commission processes, id. at 7, Chart 1, 82 percent of men and 67 percent of
women were covered by awards, determinations and collective agreements. Id. at
8, Table 3.
86. Of sales workers, the occupational group with the lowest proportion of employees
covered by commission processes, id. at 7, Chart 2, 77 percent of men and 91 per-
cent of women were covered by awards, determinations and collective agree-
ments. Id. at 10, Table 5.
87. Gregory & Anstie, supra note 66, at 6.
88. AusTRALiAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, DISTRMUTION AND COMPOSMON OF EM-
PLOYEE EARNINGS AND HOURS, AUSTRALIA, MAY 1985 (ABS Cat. No. 6306.0). See
also Brown, supra note 79, 140, 145-48 (although the data permit only rough esti-
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over-award payments contribute to the female-male wage gap,8 9 as we
shall see, they have not been used to counteract significantly efforts to
narrow the wage gap.90
B. Women's Pay
1. History
The Arbitration Commission began to treat women differently
than men very early in its history.91 The decisions, like the decision to
create the Commission,92 were very much products of their times.
The Commission first considered female wages in the Rural Work-
ers' Cases of 1912.93 In the case, Mr. Justice Higgins decided that male
and female fruit-pickers should be paid the same wage rate but wo-
men working as fruit-packers should be paid less than the male wage
rate. Female fruit-pickers were paid the same wage rate as men be-
cause both men and women were employed in the occupation. If wo-
men were paid less, Mr. Justice Higgins reasoned, there would be "a
tendency [for employers] to substitute women for men ... even in
occupations which are more suited for men."94 Thus, to protect the
jobs of the men-to insure that "[t]he women are not all dragged from
the homes to work while men loaf at home" 95-Higgins prescribed
equal wage rates for male and female fruit-pickers. With respect to
fruit-packers, however, Higgins decided that women should be paid
less than the male wage rate. Since nearly all fruit-packers were wo-
men, there was no need to pay them the same as men to protect male
jobs. Rather, Higgins decided that the fruit-packers should be paid a
mates, the contribution of over-award payment to overall increases in annual
earnings ranged from 3 percent to 49 percent from 1955-82).
89. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
91. For general discussions of the history of equal pay, see DEERY & PLOWMAN, supra
note 18, at 308-11; AUSTRALIAN LABOUR ECONOMICS: READlINGS, supra note 82, at
117-40; HUTsoN, supra note 45, at 107-30.
92. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
93. 6 C.A.R. 61, 70-73 (1912).
94. I- at 72.
95. Id. at 72. Mr. Justice Higgins was even more explicit about this rationale in a
later case:
[If there are not enough jobs to go round, it is better that men should get
the jobs rather than women, as a matter of social expediency. If there
are 1,000 jobs vacant, and 1,000 men and 1,000 women want the jobs, it is
better for society-if the candidates are equally qualified-that most of
the jobs should go to men. The tendency of lower wages for women, injobs for which men and women are in competition, is to make the woman
the wage-earner and to leave the men to look after the house. There is
much more danger incident to the forcing of men out of an industry to
which they are suited than to the forcing out of women, even if they are
equally suited.
Federated Clothing Trades Case, 13 C.A.R. 647, 702 (1919).
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living wage-a wage sufficient to satisfy "the normal needs of the av-
erage employee regarded as a human being living in a civilized com-
munity."9 6 The living wage established by Higgins for female
workers, however, was less than the living wage he had established for
male workers. Women only had to support themselves, while men
had to support a family.9 7 As a result, Higgins set the basic wage
rate98 for female fruit-packers at 66 percent of the basic wage rate for
male workers.9 9 The principles developed by Judge Higgins were to
survive for half a century, but compared to the wage rates women
were to receive under these principles for the next thirty years, Judge
Higgins was generous.
Until World War II, the basic wage rate for women was generally
set at 54 percent of the male basic wage rate, although there was some
fluctuation between 48 and 58 percent. 10o Because occupations then,
as now, were quite sex-segregated, only a handful of job classifications
received equal pay under Higgins' competition rationale.101
This three decade period of relative stability in the relationship be-
tween female and male wages was disrupted, along with a number of
other things, by World War II. In Australia, as in the United States, 102
96. Rural Workers' Cases of 1912,6 C.A.R. 61,71 (1912)(citing Harvester Judgment, 2
C.A.R. 1, 3 (1907), which originated the concept of the living, or basic, wage). See
supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
97. Rural Workers' Cases of 1912, 6 C.A.R. 61, 71-72 (1912). See also Australian The-
atrical & Amusement Employees' Case, 11 C.A.R. 133 (1917):
This Court allows to men a living wage based on the assumption that
the average man has to keep a wife and family of three children
whatever the value of the work he does may be. The Court allows a
living wage to a woman as a single woman. The single man often gets
more than his work is worth, but if single men are paid less than married
men the cheaper labour would be employed and they could not make the
necessary provision for marriage.
Id. at 146.
98. The "living wage" discussed by Judge Higgins in the Harvester case soon came to
be called the "basic wage."
99. Rural Workers' Cases of 1912, 6 C.A.R. 61, 73 (1912).
100. See Federated Clothing Trades Case, 13 C.A.R. 647, 690-95 (1919)(57 percent);
Federated Felt Hatting Employees' Case, 15 C.A.R. 374,386-87 (1921)(54 percent);
Clothing & Allied Trades Employees' Case, 26 C.A.R. 89, 99 (1927)(55.5 percent).
See generally HUTSON, supra note 45, at 113-14.
101. HUTSON, supra note 45, at 114.
102. The popular image of Rosie the Riveter is confirmed by labor force statistics. The
labor force participation rate for women increased from 27.9 percent in 1940 to
36.5 percent in 1944 and then reverted to 30.8 percent by 1947. Women also dis-
proportionately increased their numbers in traditionally male occupations. Be-
tween 1940 and 1950, the number of female nonfarm managers, officials and
proprietors had increased by 69 percent and the number of female craftsmen,
foremen and kindred workers had increased by 87 percent. The number of males
in both of those occupational categories had increased by only 33 percent. BU-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL
TIMEs To 1957, at 71, 74 (1960).
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women were somewhat reluctantly, but by necessity, encouraged to
enter the labor force and to engage in traditionally male occupa-
tions.103 As it was put by the High Court of Australia, "[a]s men are
no longer available in significant numbers, it has become necessary to
resort to the services of women."1 04 These changes in the scope and
type of female employment created problems. If women in the for-
merly male occupations were paid the same as the men they replaced,
it would be very difficult to retain women workers in the essential
jobs where the traditional, low rates of pay still applied. If, on the
other hand, all female wages were raised to counteract these foresee-
able labor shortages, inflationary pressures would build.105 The influx
of women workers also created a large amount of work for the Arbi-
tration Commission which was responsible for fixing wage rates. 0 6
The Women's Employment Board was established in 1942 to deal
with these problems.107 The Board was authorized to set the wages
for this new influx of women workers.108 The Board was to determine
the wages by assessing "the efficiency of females in the performance
of the work and any other special factors which may be likely to affect
the productivity of their work in relation to that of males," but the
female wage rate could not be less than 60 percent nor more than 100
103. The purpose of the Women's Employment Act 1942 was "to encourage... and
regulat[e] the employment of women for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of
the present war." § 6(a), No. 55, 40 ASUTL. AcTs P. 176, 177 (1942)(emphasis
added).
104. Victoria Chamber of Manufactures v. Commonwealth, 67 C.L.R. 347, 357 (1943).
105. AUSTRALIAN LABOUR ECONOMIcS: READINGS, supra, note 82, at 124.
106. HuTsoN, supra note 45, at 114.
107. Women's Employment Act 1942, No. 55, 40 AusTL. AcTs P. 176 (1942). The his-
tory of the Women's Employment Act is very complicated. The Governor-Gen-
eral initially attempted to create the Women's Employment Board through
regulations enacted under the National Security Act 1939-40, No. 44, 38 AusTL.
ACs P. 78 (1940). See 1942 Austl. Stat. R. Nos. 146, 236, 263, 294, 381, 393. That
attempt was frustrated when three of the regulations were disallowed by the Sen-
ate under a one-house veto provision contained in the Acts Interpretation Act
1901-41, § 48(4), 1941 AUSTL Acrs P. 33. (The Senate disallowed 1942 Austl. Stat.
R. Nos. 236, 263, 294.) Parliament then passed the Women's Employment Act
1942, No. 55, 40 AUSTL ACrs P. 176, which authorized the Governor-General to
promulgate regulations establishing the Women's Employment Board. One of
the regulations the Governor-General promulgated under that authority was also
disallowed by the Senate. 1942 Austl. Stat. R No. 548. The continued status of
the Women's Employment Board was eventually sorted out by the High Court of
Australia. Victoria Chamber of Manufactures v. The Commonwealth, 67 C.L.R.
347 (1943).
108. More specifically, the Board was authorized to determine whether women could
work in the new occupations and to set the terms and conditions of that work
where women worked after March 2, 1942 on "work which [was] usually per-
formed by males" or "work which, prior [to the employment of women] was not
being performed in Australia by any person" Women's Employment Act 1942,
§ 6(1) of the Schedule, No. 55, 40 Ausm. AcTS P. 176, 178 (1942).
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percent of the male rate for work of a substantially similar nature.109
Although there was some variation, in practice the Board generally
set the female rate at 90 percent of the rate for substantially similar
work performed by males." 0
The system was designed to insulate the wage rates of women
workers generally from the wage rates of the new group of women
workers."' The wage rates of the new group were set by the Women's
Employment Board, while the wage rates for the rest of the women
were still within the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Commission.
Moreover, the Women's Employment Act 1942 attempted to treat the
new group as a special case requiring special treatment. The women
were a special case because they were working on work "usually per-
formed by males" or "work which [shortly before] was not being per-
formed in Australia by any person,"112 because they were engaged in
this work to "aid... in the prosecution of the present war,"1' 3 and
because their wages were to be set based on standards different from
the standards applied by the Arbitration Commission. 114 The at-
tempted insulation failed. In 1942 and 1943, the Arbitration Commis-
sion raised the award rates of women working in the metal trades,
clothing and rubber industries to 75 percent of the male award rate"is
and, in 1945, after the Commission refused to raise the female rates in
twelve other industries to 75 percent of the male rate,116 the Govern-
ment did so itself under its wartime powers."i7
In October 1944 the Women's Employment Board ceased to func-
109. Id at § 6(5) of the Schedule, 40 AusTL. AcTs P. 176, 179.
110. AUSTRALIAN LABOUR EcONOMIcS: READINGS, supra note 82, at 125; HUSON,
supra note 45, at 115.
111. AUSTRALIAN LABOUR ECONOMICS: READINGS, supra note 82, at 125.
112. Women's Employment Act 1942, § 6(1) of the Schedule, 40 AuSTL. ACTS P. 176,
178 (1942).
113. Id at § 6(a) of the Schedule, 40 AUSTL. ACTS P. 176, 177 (1942).
114. Id at § 6(5) of the Schedule, 40 AusTL. AcTs P. 176, 179 (1942). See Arms Explo-
sives & Munitions Workers Case, 50 C.A.R. 191, 200-14 (1943).
115. Metal Trades Award, 47 C.A.R. 776,788 (1942); Amalgamated Clothing and Allied
Trades Case, 51 C.A.R. 632, 635 (1943); Federated Rubber and Allied Workers
Case, 51 C.A.R 648, 650 (1943).
116. Female Minimum Rates Case, 54 C.A.R. 613 (1945). The case came before the
Commission because the Government, by regulation, had requested the Commis-
sion to increase the female rate to 75 percent of the male rate in the following
industries: woolen and worsted textile manufacturing;, cotton textile manufac-
turing; knitting and hosiery manufacturing;, fruit and vegetable preserving, pickle
and jam making, fruit juices and cordial preparation; meat preserving;, milk
processing, butter, cheese and margarine making;, egg processing and packing;,
boot and shoe making; aircraft manufacturing & assembling;, munitions manufac-
turing; motor, body, coach or carriage building;, and domestic workers in hospitals
and asylums. National Security (Female Minimum Rates) Regulations, Stat.
Rules 1944, No. 108, 1944 Austl. Stat. R. No. 581.
117. National Security (Female Minimum Rates) Regulations, 1945 Austl. Stat. R. No.
139.
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tion and full jurisdiction over female rates returned to the Commis-
sion.1 s However, the changes resulting from the war and the Board's
actions had caused, in sharp contrast to the long period of stability
from 1912-42, large variations in female wage rates:
In some areas, either equal pay or 900 of the male rate were prescribed be-
cause of pressure from the trade unions and the continuation of the authority
of the decisions of the Women's Employment Board until 1949. In other areas,
75% of the male rate was prescribed, and in others the 54% rate was pre-
scribed. The employers, however, were unable to maintain the lower 54% rate
because the demand for female labour continued, and this forced the market
rate above that rate.1 1 9
In the 1949-50 Basic Wage Inquiry, 20 the Commission recognized
that the traditional 54 percent rate was no longer viable. Basing its
decision primarily on the prevailing industry practice, which was to
pay women about 75 percent of the male wage,121 the Commission set
the female basic wage12 2 at 75 percent of the male basic wage.1 2 3 The
shock caused by the war was over and the new rate, like the old 54
percent rate, enjoyed a long period of stability, although the word "en-
joyed" may not apply as well to the women receiving the rate.
2. The Equal Pay Efforts
The 75 percent basic wage rate for women survived for nearly two
decades. The Commission eliminated it, and the long-standing, insti-
tutionalized wage discrimination against women, in three decisions be-
ginning in 1969.124
118. Women's Employment Regulations, 1944 Austl. Stat. R. No. 149.
119. HuTsON, supra note 45, at 116. See also Metal Trades Award 1941, 60 C.A.R. 1405
(1948):
[From our review of several awards in which female rates of pay were
prescribed,] no standard can be found while there are almost as many
female minimum rates as there are awards....
Thus it is true to say the adult female minimum rate of remuneration
in the sense of a foundational rate upon which an arbitrator may build
his wage structure does not exist, it has neither been found nor fixed by
the Court nor can it be ascertained from the awards.
I& at 1417 (emphasis in original).
120. 68 C.A.R. 698 (1949).
121. I at 815-19.
122. The Arbitration Act had been amended in 1949 to give the Commission the au-
thority to set a basic wage for females. Commonwealth Conciliation Arbitration
Act (No. 2) 1949, 47 AUSTL. ACrS P. 267 (1949). Thus, although the Commission
had established defacto basic wages for females since 1912, this case was techni-
cally the first case in which a female basic wage was established.
123. Two of the three judges on the Commission panel hearing the case opted for the
75 percent rate. 1949-50 Basic Wage Inquiry, 68 C-.AR. 698, 815-19, 838-39 (1949).
The other judge voted to retain the old 54 percent standard. Id. at 782-86.
124. The 75 percent ratio actually began to erode shortly before the 1969 Equal Pay
Case. In the National Wage Cases in 1967 and 1968, the Commission awarded flat
increases of $1.00 and $1.35, respectively, to the wage rates of both men and wo-
men. This had the effect of slightly increasing the ratio of female-to-male wages.
1992]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:581
The first of the decisions was Equal Pay Cases 19692 in which the
Commission announced principles that were roughly analogous to the
concept of "equal pay for equal work" in the United States.126 To
reach that result, however, the Commission first had to deal with the
conceptual basis of the basic wage' 27 and, in particular, with the "liv-
ing" or "family" wage concept which historically had been used to jus-
tify differences between male and female wages. 2 8 If the family wage
concept was still viable, the Commission could only change the rela-
tionship between male and female wages by examining the relative
family responsibilities of male and female workers and by determin-
ing whether those responsibilities had changed sufficiently in recent
years to justify an increase in the wages of women relative to men.
Rather than engage in that very difficult inquiry, the Commission de-
cided that the family wage concept had been considerably eroded'29
National Wage Cases 1967, 118 C.A.R. 655, 657 (1967); National Wage Cases 1968,
124 C.A.R. 463, 467-68 (1968).
125. 127 C.A.R 1142 (1969). In a previous case, the Commission had all but asked that
the issue be placed before it:
The community is faced with economic, industrial and social chal-
lenges arising from the history of female wage fixation. Our adoption of
the concept of a total wage [see infra note 127] has allowed us to take an
important step forward in regard to female wages. We have on this occa-
sion deliberately awarded the same increase to adult females and adult
males. The recent Clothing Trades Decision, 118 C.A.R. 286 (1967), af-
firmed the concept of equal margins for adult males and females doing
equal work. The extension of that concept to the total wage would in-
volve economic and industrial sequels and calls for thorough investiga-
tion and debate in which a policy of gradual implementation could be
considered... We invite the unions, the employers and the Common-
wealth to give careful study to these questions with the knowledge that
the Commission is available to assist by conciliation or arbitration in the
resolution of the problems.
National Wage Cases 1967, 118 C.A.R. 655, 660 (1967).
126. For a more detailed comparison of the Australian and American concepts, see
infra notes 183-97 and accompanying text.
127. The "basic wage" and "margins" conceptual framework had been abandoned by
the Commission in 1967 and replaced with a "total wage," which combined the
basic wage and margins into one figure. National Wage Cases 1967,118 C.A.R. 655
(1967). The case, however, did not revise the conceptual bases for determining
wages. In particular, the case did not discuss the status of the "living" or "family"
wage concept which was used to justify the difference between male and female
wages.
128. See supra notes 41-45, 97-99 and accompanying text.
129. Equal Pay Cases 1969,127 C.A.R. 1142,1152-53 (1969). Ironically, the Commission
relied on its decision in the 1949-50 Basic Wage Inquiry, 68 C.A.R. 698 (1949), to
support its claim that the family wage concept had erodedh
This decision caused an erosion of the concept of the family wage be-
cause if before the decision it had been desirable for family considera-
tions that there should be a 54 percent relationship, the mere fact that
industry was paying more should not have caused the Court to change
the percentage[,] unless the Court was departing from the concept of [the
family] wage.
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and, as a result, was "no real bar to a consideration of equal pay for
equal work."130 As a result, while recognizing that there was still a
"relic" of the family wage in the wage structure,1 31 the Commission
ended its half century of reliance on the family wage and so removed
what had been a significant barrier to equal wages for women.
After having disposed of that barrier to change, the Commission
decided to follow the lead of four states that required "equal pay for
equal work."13 2 The state efforts justified change, the Commission
said, because they demonstrated "that there is a belief in this commu-
nity that equal pay for equal work is a socially proper one" 33 and be-
cause they made it necessary to harmonize the approaches of the state
and federal tribunals on the issue. 34
Nevertheless, the Commission was cautious in ordering changes:
While we accept the concept of "equal pay for equal work" implying as it does
the elimination of discrimination based on sex alone, we realise that the con-
cept is difficult of precise definition and even more difficult to apply with pre-
cision.... [Rather than order a broad solution as urged by the unions, we]
consider it preferable to start from a decision or principle [based on the State
Acts] and let that principle be worked through the system.'-35
The Commission announced nine principles that were to be applied
to implement equal pay for equal work. 3 6 The principles required
men and women to be paid the same when "female employees are per-
Equal Pay Cases 1969,127 C.A.R. 1142,1152 (1969). Thus, according to the Com-
mission, the conceptual basis for female-male wage differentials, the family wage,
had eroded 20 years before the Commission decided to reduce the differentials.
130. Id. at 1153.
131. I& Indeed, the Commission explicitly relied on the "family wage" concept to pre-
serve another type of discrimination against women. The minimum wage applied
only to males because of the family wage concept National Wage and Equal Pay
Cases 1972, 147 CAL 172, 176 (1972).
132. The Commission referred to four states that had passed legislation requiring
equal pay for equal work-New South Wales, South Australia, Western Austra-
lia, and Tasmania (where it was confined to the public service). See Industrial
Arbitration (female rates) Amendment Act, No. 42,1958 N.S.W. Stat. 451,454-55;
Industrial Code, 1967, No. 74, 1967 S. Austl. Acts 739, 796-97; Industrial Arbitra-
tion Act Amendment Act, 1968, No. 47, 1968 W. Austl. Stat. 305, 311-12; Public
Service (Equal Pay) Act 1966, No. 60, 44 Tas. Acts 282, 283-86 (1966).
133. Equal Pay Cases 1969, 127 C.A.R. 1142, 1153 (1969).
134. Id. The Commission also considered arguments based on international materials
and on the potential economic effects of its decisions. The Commission was not
persuaded by the international materials calling for equal pay (in particular In-
ternational Labor Organization conventions calling for equal pay) because
neither Australia nor other advanced western industrial countries (such as the
United Kingdom, United States, and Canada) had ratified them. Id. at 1155. On
the economic effect of its decision the Commission said that "[w]hile we are not
able to quantify with any accuracy the effect of our decision, it should cause no
significant economic problems" because of the gradual implementation. Id. at
1155.
135. Id at 1156.
136. The nine principles were as follows:
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forming the same work or work of a like nature as male employees
and doing the same range and volume of work as male employees and
under the same conditions."137 They also provided, however, that
"equal pay should not be provided.., where the work in question is
essentially or usually performed by females but is work upon which
male employees may also be employed."
38
The principles, ironically, were very similar to Justice Higgins'
original 1912 principles.13 9 Women and men were to be paid the same
where they were in competition, but where the work was "women's
work," women could be paid less. Higgins' principles had not been
consistently and uniformly applied, so the 1969 principles, as stated,140
(1) the male and female employees concerned, who must be adults,
should be working under the terms of the same determination or award;
(2) it should be established that certain work covered by the determi-
nation or award is performed by both males and females;
(3) the work performed by both the males and the females under
such determination or award should be of the same or a like nature and
of equal value, but mere similarity in name of male and female classifica-
tions may not be enough to establish that males and females do work of a
like nature;
(4) for the purpose of determining whether the female employees
are performing work of the same or a like nature and of equal value as
the male employees the Arbitrator or the Commissioner, as the case may
be, should in addition to any other relevant matters, take into considera-
tion whether the female employees are performing the same work or
work of a like nature as male employees and doing the same range and
volume of work as male employees and under the same condition;
(5) consideration should be restricted to work performed under the
determination or award concerned;
(6) in cases where males and females are doing work of the same or a
like nature and of equal value, there may be no appropriate classifica-
tions for that work. In such a case appropriate classifications should be
established for that work which is performed by both males and females
and rates of pay established for that work. The classifications should not
be of a generic nature covering a wide variety of work;
(7) in considering whether males and females are performing work
of the same or like nature and of equal value, consideration should not
be restricted to the situation in one establishment but should extend to
the general situation under the determination or award concerned, un-
less the award or determination applies to only one establishment;
(8) the expression of "equal value" should not be construed as mean-
ing "of equal value to the employer" but as of equal value or at least of
equal value from the point of view of wage or salary assessment;
(9) notwithstanding the above, equal pay should not be provided by
application of the above principles where the work in question is essen-
tially or usually performed by females but is work upon which male em-
ployees may also be employed.
Id. at 1158-59.
137. Id at 1158.
138. Id at 1159.
139. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text. See Christine Short, Equal Pay-
What Happened?, 28 J. INDus. REL. 315, 318 (1986); AUSTRALIAN LABOUR ECO-
NOmiCS: READINGS, supra note 82, at 128.
140. In practice, the 1969 principles appeared to have a much larger effect than a nar-
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would benefit those women who were not receiving equal pay even
though they were performing equal work in areas that were not fe-
male dominated. The majority of women workers, however, worked
in female dominated areas and, hence, did not stand to benefit from
the decision.' 41
The Commission also attached limitations to its decision that, in a
very real sense, made their decision less generous than Higgins' 1912
decision. First, the decision was to be phased in over a period of three
years. Women who qualified under the principles were to receive 85
percent of the male rate beginning October 1, 1969; 90 percent begin-
ning January 1, 1970; 95 percent beginning January 1, 1971; and 100
percent beginning January 1, 1972.142 Second, even though the basic
wage and margins concept had been replaced with the total wage con-
cept in 1967,143 the Commission required equal pay only with respect
to male and female wage differences which were attributable to the
old "basic wage." Any differences attributable to the old "margins,"
which the Commission explicitly recognized as existing,144 did not
have to be equalized.14 5 Third, the decision did not extend the mini-
mum wage, which applied only to males, to females.146 As a result,
when the wage rate for an occupation was below the minimum wage,
women would receive the wage rate for the occupation and men would
receive the higher minimum wage.147
row reading of them would lead one to expect. See infra note 196 and accompa-
nying text.
141. In 1973, the unions claimed that only 18 percent of women in the work force had
received equal pay under the 1969 decision. National Wage and Equal Pay Cases
1972, 147 C.A.R. 172, 177 (1972).
142. Equal Pay Cases 1969, 127 CAR. 1142, 1159 (1969).
143. See supra note 127.
144. An examination of the history of ["margins"] for females produces a...
confused result. In some instances females doing the same work as
males received the same ["margins"].... In some instances... they did
not. In other cases .... they received what might be described as a com-
posite margin to cover a range of [job] classifications., So that when in
1967 the Commission introduced total wages by combining the basic
wage and margins the resultant many differences between the wages of
males and females were due to a variety of reasons.
Equal Pay Cases 1969, 127 CAR 1142, 1153 (1969).
145. I at 1158. Despite this, some decisions did equalize the total wage. See, eg.,
Metal Trades Award, 131 C.A.R. 663, 711 (1970).
146. Equal Pay Cases 1969, 127 C-AR. 1142, 1153 (1969). This distinction based on sex
also survived the 1972 Equal Pay Cases, 147 C.A.R. 172, 176 (1972). See infra
notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
147. The decision implementing equal pay in the Metal Trades Industry, for example,
granted equal pay in stages to approximately 80,000 female process workers.
Metal Trades Award, 131 C.A.R. 663, 708-11 (1970). However, since the process
worker classification was paid sixty cents per week less than the male minimum
wage, women were not paid the same as men even after the decision. HUTSON,
supra note 45, at 127.
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Despite these limitations and the ever-present problem of deter-
mining whether men and women were performing "equal work,"148
the 1969 decision influenced the relative award rates and earnings of
men and women.149 After almost two decades of constancy, the rela-
tive awards of females to males moved up from 72 percent in 1969 to
77.4 percent in 1972, an increase of 7.5 percent.150 The actual earnings
of women relative to men also moved up, from 58.4 percent in 1969 to
63.2 percent in 1972, an increase of 8 percent.151
The relative increases for women were to continue. Shortly after
the implementation period of the 1969 decision had ended,5 2 the Com-
mission issued another decision that expanded the scope of the equal
pay efforts. As with the 1969 decision, the Commission decided to ini-
tiate changes within its own wage-setting system largely because of
changes occurring elsewhere:
The broad issue we have to decide is whether in the present social and
industrial climate it is fair and reasonable that the 1969 principles should re-
main unaltered. This involves us in making an assessment of what, if any-
thing, has happened in the area of equal pay since 1969 which would make it
just and proper for us to alter those principles....
We think that broad changes of significance have occurred since 1969.
These changes are reflected in the attitudes of Governments in Australia and
in development in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and elsewhere.
[The Commission then noted that the submissions of the Tasmanian and
Commonwealth Government supported the concept of equal work for equal
value; that the United Kingdom passed legislation in 1970 which supported the
concept; and that a bill was introduced in New Zealand in 1972 providing for
equal pay.]
[C]hanges [have also] occurred in other countries [which provide] addi-
tional evidence of a world wide trend towards equal pay for females.
All these changes require us to reconsider the 1969 principles and to look
at them in the light of present circumstances.... In our view the concept of
"equal pay for equal work" is too narrow in today's world and we think the
time has come to enlarge the concept to "equal pay for work of equal value."
This means award rates for all work should be considered without regard to
the sex of the employee.1 5 3
The Commission announced seven new principles which were to
148. See, e.g., Federal Meat Industry Interim Award, 129 C.A.R. 743 (1969)(approxi-
mately 120 women out of 2,000 employed under award were found to be engaged
in "equal work" with men). See HUTSON, supra note 45, at 126-27.
149. For more detailed discussions of the effects of the equal pay efforts, see infra
notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
150. R.G. Gregory et al., Women in the Australian Labor Force: Trends, Causes, and
Consequences, 3 J. LAB. ECON. S293, S300 (1985).
151. Id
152. The last increase under the 1969 decision was to be phased in on January 1, 1972.
Equal Pay Cases 1969, 127 C.A.R. 1142, 1159 (1969). The 1972 decision was issued
on December 15, 1972. National Wage and Equal Pay Cases 1972, 147 C.A.R. 172
(1972).
153. National Wage and Equal Pay Cases 1972, 147 C.A.R. 172, 177-78 (1972).
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supplement the 1969 principles. 54 The first principle explicitly pro-
vided that the concept of "equal pay for work of equal value" should
154. The principles were as follows:
1. The principle of 'equal pay for work of equal value' will be ap-
plied to all awards of the Commission. By 'equal pay for work of equal
value' we mean the fixation of award wage rates by a consideration of
the work performed irrespective of the sex of the worker. The principle
will apply to both adults and juniors. Because the male minimum wage
takes account of family considerations it will not apply to females.
2. Adoption of the new principle requires that female rates e deter-
mined by work value comparisons without regard to the sex of the em-
ployees concerned. Differentiations between male rates in awards of the
Commission have traditionally been founded on work value investiga-
tions of various occupational groups or classifications. The gap between
the level of male and female rates in awards generally is greater than the
gap, if any, in the comparative value of work performed by the two sexes
because rates for female classifications in the same award have generally
been fixed without a comparative evaluation of the work performed by
males and females.
3. The new principle may be applied by agreement or arbitration.
The eventual outcome should be a single rate for an occupational group
or classification which rate is payable to the employee performing the
work whether the employee be male or female. Existing geographical
differences between rates will not be affected by this decision.
4. Implementation of the new principle by arbitration will call for
the exercise of the broad judgment which has characterised work value
inquiries. Different criteria will continue to apply from case to case and
may vary from one class of work to another. However, work value in-
quiries which are concerned with comparisons of work and fixation of
award rates irrespective of the sex of employees may encounter unfamil-
iar issues. In so far as those issues have been raised we will comment on
them. Other issues which may arise will be resolved in the context of
the particular work value inquiry with which the arbitration is con-
cerned.
5. We now deal with issues which have arisen from the material and
argument placed before us and which call for comment or decision.
(a) The automatic application of any formula which seeks to by-pass
a consideration of the work performed is, in our view, inappropriate
to the implementation of the principle we have adopted. However,
pre-existing award relativities may be a relevant factor in appropri-
ate cases.
(b) Work value comparisons should, where possible, be made be-
tween female and male classifications within the award under con-
sideration. But where such comparisons are unavailable or
inconclusive, as may be the case where the work is performed exclu-
sively by females, it may be necessary to take into account compari-
sons of work value between female classifications within the award
and/or comparisons of work value between female classifications in
different awards. In some cases comparisons with male classifica-
tions in other awards may be necessary.
(c) The value of the work refers to worth in terms of award wage or
salary fixation, not worth to the employer.
(d) Although a similarity in name may indicate a similarity of work,
it may be found on closer examination that the same name has been
given to different work. In particular this situation may arise with
generic classifications. A similar situation may arise with respect to
junior employees. Whether in such circumstances it is appropriate
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apply to all awards of the Commission. 5 5 Equal value was defined
generally as the determination of wage rates "by a consideration of the
work performed irrespective of the sex of the worker." 5 6 That gen-
eral concept was to be implemented primarily by comparing the work
of female workers with the work of male workers. 5 7
The 1972 decision eliminated two of the significant limitations of
the 1969 decision. First, it extended the concept of equal pay to wo-
men doing work which was "essentially or usually performed by fe-
males."158 Women working as secretaries or nurses or in other female
dominated occupations were now covered by the equal pay mandate.
Because most women worked in those occupations, the 1969 decision
had only reached about 18 percent of working women.159 The new
decision would apply to all working women. Second, the 1972 decision
applied to the total wage rate and not just to the portion of the wage
to establish new classifications or categories will be a matter for the
arbitrator.
(e) In consonance with normal work value practice it will be for the
arbitrator to determine whether differences in the work performed
are sufficiently significant to warrant a differentiation in rate and if
so what differentiation is appropriate. It will also be for the arbitra-
tor to determine whether restrictions on the performance of work
by females under a particular award warrant any differentiation in
rate based on the relative value of the work. We should however
indicate that claims for differentiation based on labour turnover or
absenteeism should be rejected.
(f) The new principle will have no application to the minimum wage
for adult males which is determined on factors unrelated to the na-
ture of the work performed.
6. Both the social and economic consequences of our decision will be
considerable and implementation will take some time. It is our intention
that rates in all awards of this Commission and all determinations under
the Public Service Arbitration Act should have been fixed in accordance
with this decision by 30 June 1975. Under normal circumstances, imple-
mentation should take place by three equal instalments so that one-third
of any increase is payable no later than 31 December 1973, half of the
remainder by 30 September 1974 and the balance by 30 June 1975. This
programme is intended as a norm and we recognise that special circum-
stances may exist which require special treatment.
7. Nothing we have said is intended to rescind the 1969 principles
applicable to equal pay for equal work which will continue to apply in
appropriate cases. We have taken this step because an injustice might be
created in cases based on equal pay for equal work where females could
become entitled immediately to male rates under those principles.
Id- at 179-80.
155. Id at 179.
156. 1&
157. Id, at 180.
158. Equal Pay Cases 1969, 127 C.A.R. 1142, 1159 (1969).
159. National Wage and Equal Pay Cases 1972, 147 C.A.R. 172, 177 (1972). Although
the Commission cited this figure in its decision, it also recognized that it was very
difficult to make an accurate estimate. Id-
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rate attributable to the old "basic wage" as had the 1969 decision.160
The Commission decided to phase in the 1972 decision, as it had the
1969 decision,161 but this time in three installments over a period of
approximately two-and-one-half years. Equal pay was to be fully im-
plemented by June 30, 1975.162
The Commission, however, left in place one principle which dis-
criminated against women. The Commission refused to extend the
male minimum wage to women.163 Curiously, the Commission re-
fused to extend the minimum wage to women because of the "family
wage"164 which had been rejected as a concept barring equal pay in the
1969 decision,165 but which reared its weary head one last time in the
Commission's discussion of the minimum wage. It was to be a brief
last gasp.
In 1974, the Commission decided that the family wage concept
should not apply to minimum wage determinations166 and so decided
to set a minimum wage for women at the same rate as that for men.1 67
Although the minimum wage increase for women was also phased in,
full equality of the minimum wage was to be achieved on the same
date the phasing in of the 1972 decision was to be completed.168 As a
result, on June 30, 1975, women in Australia reached full, formal
equality with men in the wage-setting process.
3. Women's Pay Under Formal Equality-1969 to the Present
Formal equality is nice, but as women in the United States have
discovered over the past 25 years, it does not necessarily mean that the
wages of women relative to men will increase. In the United States,
women received full formal equality in wage-setting with the passage
of the Equal Pay Act in 1963 and Title VII in 1964.169 Nevertheless,
the wages of women in the United States relative to those of men re-
160. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
162. The 1972 decision was issued on December 15, 1972. National Wage and Equal
Pay Cases 1972, 147 C.A.R. 172, 175 (1972). One-third of any increase resulting
from the decision was to be payable by December 31, 1973; one-third by Septem-
ber 30, 1974; and one-third by June 30, 1975. Id at 180.
163. Id. at 176.
164. Id
165. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
166. National Wage Case 1974, 157 C.A.R. 293, 298-301 (1974).
167. Id. at 299.
168. I. at 300.
169. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 required equal pay for men and women doing the
same work and Title VII prohibited other types of wage discrimination against
women. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1988); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). See County
of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981)(Title VIi's prohibition of sex-based
wage discrimination is broader than that of the Equal Pay Act).
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mained quite stable at about 60 percent for the following two decades,
and began to increase only in the last few years.170
The change to formal equality in Australia could have been equally
ineffective (or at least slow) despite the existence of wage-setting
tribunals. The Equal Pay Decisions were merely announcements of
principle that were to be implemented as individual disputes arose;171
the wage-setting tribunals could have failed to implement the Deci-
sions or could have implemented them in a niggardly fashion. Fur-
ther, men could have attempted to maintain their historic advantages
through over-awards which were largely outside of the control of the
wage-setting process. Nevertheless, despite these possibilities and in
contrast to the experience with formal equality in the United States,
the relative wages of women in Australia did increase, and increase
quite dramatically, after the Equal Pay Decisions.
From the time of the first Equal Pay Decision in 1969 until full
implementation in 1975, women in Australia increased their earnings
relative to men by 25 to 30 percent. The precise increase varies a bit
depending on the comparison made and, as Table 1 indicates, there are
many possible comparisons. But regardless of the comparison, the in-
crease in the relative wages of women in Australia between 1969 and
1975 was significant. The ratio of female-to-male weekly earnings in-
creased 30 percent, the ratio of award rates increased 26 percent, and
the ratio of hourly earnings, available only from 1972 to 1975, in-
creased 12 percent.172 Perhaps even more significantly, the increased
female-to-male wage ratio has not dissipated over time, but has re-
mained quite stable since 1975.
The gains made by women in Australia from the increase in rela-
tive wages could have been undermined by reductions in the employ-
ment of women. If the gains made by women who received the higher
170. See figure 1 infra.
171. [Finding a satisfactory solution to the issues now before us [is very diffi-
cult]. We consider it preferable to start from a decision on principle in
this case and let that principle be worked through the system.
Equal Pay Cases, 127 C.A.R. 1142, 1156 (1969).
172. Professor Killingsworth has recently raised the issue of whether the significant
increases in relative female wages in the long-term can be attributed to the equal
pay decisions. He argues that the equal pay decisions had a considerable effect in
the short-term on relative female wages, but that the effect wore off quickly and
does not explain the seemingly permanent increase in relative female wages in
Australia. MARK R. KILLINGSWORTH, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPARABLE WORTH
250-60 (1990). Unfortunately, his analysis is quite flawed, as two of us have indi-
cated elsewhere. R.G. Gregory & A.E. Daly, Can Economic Theory Explain Why
Australian Women Are So Well Paid Relative to Their U.S. Counterparts?, 3
INT'L REV. COMP. PUB. POL'Y 81 (1991). A proper economic analysis supports
one's intuitions about the causes of the increase in women's wages in Australia-
the increases occurred immediately after the equal pay decisions and were caused
by them. Id
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Table 1
Female-to-Male Wage Ratios in Australia, 1964-88
Year Award Rates' Weekly Earnings Hourly Earnings'
1964 72.0 59.2 n.a.
1966 71.0 57.8 n.a.
1967 72.4 58.2 n.a.
1968 71.0 57.0 n.a.
1969 72.0 58.4 n.a.
1970 73.2 59.1 n.a.
1971 74.6 60.7 n.a.
1972 77.4 63.2 76.2
1973 79.4 65.9 78.6
1974 85.2 70.9 82.2
1975 90.8 75.7 85.5
1976 92.4 77.1 87.4
1977 93.2 76.6 88.3
1978 92.9 75.6 88.1
1979 92.1 74.1 87.5
1980 91.7 75.2 87.5
1981 93.1 75.3 n.e.
1982 91.5 75.7 84.5
1983 91.5 75.8 85.0
1984 91.7 76.6 87.5
1985 91.8 76.7 89.2
1986 92.1 77.8 88.4
1987 92.6 77.3 89.0
1988 92.2 77.7 90.2
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Wage Rate Indexes (Cat. No. 6314.0), Earn-
ings and Hours of Employees (Cat. No. 6304.0), and Average Earnings and
Hours of Employees (Cat. No. 6304.0).
Adult average minimum award rates for a full week's work, all industry groups, aver-
age of four quarters each year.
"Adult average weekly earnings for full-time non-managerial employees in the private
sector. New series from 1981.
Non-overtime hourly earnings for full-time non-managerial employees.
wages were offset by losses to women who were laid off or had their
hours reduced because of the higher wages, the overall position of wo-
men in the labor force would have been largely unchanged despite the
relative increase in wages. Economists regularly predict that exoge-
nous increases in female wages (such as the increases in Australia)
and other types of exogenous increases in wages (such as increases in
the minimum wage) will be counterproductive because of the resul-
tant reductions in employment. 173
In Australia, however, the effect of the relative wage increases on
173. See, e.g., Mark R. Killingsworth, Heterogeneous Preferences, Compensating Wage
Differentials, and Comparable Worth, 102 Q.J. ECON. 727 (1987); MARK ALDRICH
& ROBERT BucHELE, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPARABLE WORTH 155-68 (1986); IR-
VIN SHAPmO, THE InIMUM WAGE AND JOB Loss (Washington, D.C.: Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, 1988); Charles Brown et al., The Effect of the Mini-
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employment was quite small. From 1969 to 1975, female employment
relative to male employment increased despite the significant in-
creases in relative female wages.'7 4 Relative female employment con-
tinued to increase after 1975.175 Thus, the wage increases did not have
an immediate or a delayed effect on the direction of relative female
employment. The relative wage increases, however, did seem to have
an adverse impact on the rate of increase of female employment.
From 1969 to 1975, female employment grew relative to male employ-
ment at an annual rate of about 3 percent. Gregory and Duncan esti-
mated that the rate of increase would have been about 4.5 percent in
the absence of the wage increases. But Gregory and Duncan qualified
that conclusion by noting that factors other than the wage increases
(such as tariff reductions that reduced employment in female-inten-
sive industries) contributed to the reduction in the rate of increase in
female employment. Their overall conclusion was that the effect of
the wage increases on female employment was "very small." 76
The effect of the relative wage increases on unemployment mir-
rored the effect on employment. Female unemployment relative to
male unemployment went down between 1969 and 1975, but Gregory
and Duncan found that the wage increases reduced the extent of the
reduction. In 1977, after the relative wage increases were in place, fe-
male employment was about 0.5 of a percentage point higher than it
would have been in the absence of the relative wage increases.' 77
Gregory and Duncan concluded that female unemployment was "re-
markably unresponsive" to the increases in relative female wages.' 78
The extent to which these modest employment losses undermined
the gains to women from the relative wage increases can be assessed
by examining the share of the total wages in Australia paid to women.
mum Wage on Employment and Unemployment, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 487
(1982).
174. Between 1969 and 1975, relative female employment increased from 31.6 percent
to 34.6 percent. Gregory & Anstie, supra note 66, at 24a.
175. Relative female employment increased to 35.0 percent in 1976, 36.4 percent in
1981, and 39.9 percent in 1986. Relative female employment increased every year
from 1969 to 1986, except for 1979 when there was a .4 percent decrease. Id.
176. R.G. Gregory & R.C. Duncan, Segmented Labor Market Theories and the Austra-
lian Experience of Equal Pay for Women, 3 J. PosT KEYNESIAN ECON. 403,420-21,
426 (1981). Others have relied on the Gregory and Duncan study to argue that
the adverse employment effects of the wage increase were significant. Killings-
worth, supra note 173, at 740; ALDRICH & BUCHELE, supra note 173, at 159-60. But
see KjLLINGsWORTH, supra note 172, at 260-63 (the wage increases had a notice-
able but small initial negative impact on relative female employment, but the
effect wore off fairly quickly). Those commentators, however, do not take into
account, as Gregory and Duncan do in reaching their conclusion, the role of other
factors operating at the same time as the wage increases (such as tariffs) that also
reduced the rate of increase of female employment.
177. Gregory & Duncan, supra note 176, at 424-25.
178. Id. at 425.
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If relative female wages increased and there were no employment ef-
fects, the portion of total wages paid to women would increase. Alter-
natively, if employment losses were significant, the portion of total
wages paid to women could remain stable even after increases in the
wages of women relative to men. From 1969 to 1976, the share of total
wages in Australia paid to women increased from 20 percent to 28 per-
cent. Gregory and Duncan estimated that without the wage increases,
but at the higher employment level that would have resulted, the fe-
male share of total wages would have increased to 23 percent.1 79 The
gains to women from the relative wage increases, then, more than off-
set the losses to women from reductions in female employment.
Even an overall gain to women, however, might be troublesome if
the gains from the wage increases went disproportionately to one class
(for example professional or younger women), while the employment
losses were disproportionately borne by another class (for example
blue collar or older women). But that did not happen in Australia.
The gains and losses to women in Australia were distributed quite
equally by income (Table 2), industry (Table 3), occupation (Table 4),
and age (Table 5).180
Table 2
Income Distribution by Quintile, Earned Income of
Full-year, Full-time Female Workers
1968-69 1973-74 1978-79
Lowest 10.0 9.6 10.2
2nd 14.9 15.6 16.3
3rd 18.3 18.9 19.5
4th 21.8 22.7 22.6
Highest 34.9 33.4 31.4
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Income Distribution 1968-69, Table 57 (Ref.
No. 17.17); Income Distribution, Austrialia, 1978-79, Table 39 (Cat. No.
4108.0).
179. I& at 423-24.
180. This distribution of the gains across various subgroups of women contrasts quite
sharply with the distribution of the gains contributing to the increasing female-
male earnings ratio during the 1980s in the United States. See infra note 246.
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Table 3
Female-To-Male Earnings In Selected Industries,
Full-Time, Non-Managerial Adult Employees,
1966 and 1976
Percent Percent
Industry Female' 1966 1976 Increase
Food, drink and tobacco 25 58.4 76.2 30.5
Textiles, clothing and 66 58.6 76.1 29.9
footwear
Paper, printing, etc. 27 54.8 70.8 29.1
Chemicals, dyes, 26 57.6 72.5 25.9
explosives, etc.
Foundry, engineering, 16 55.9 74.5 33.2
vehicles, etc.
Building and 4 58.4 67.9 16.2
construction
Transport and storage 12 56.6 75.4 33.2
Finance and property 44 60.5 81.1 34.0
Wholesale trade, etc. 27 65.0 80.4 23.7
Retail trade, etc. 48 64.8 85.0 31.1
Unweighted average of 1966 and 1976 percentage, except for "Foundry, engineering,
vehicles, etc." which is the 1966 percentage.
Sources: Gregory & Anstie, supra note 66, at Table 4.
Australian Census, 1966 and 1976.
Table 4
Female-to-Male Mean Earnings by Broad Occupational
Grouping For Full-Year, Full-Time Workers
Broad occupational 1968-69 1973-74 % increase 1978-79 % increase % increase
grouping from 1968 from 1968 from 1973
Prof. & Admin. .48 .62 29 .67 40 8
Clerical .57 .66 16 .71 25 8
Sales .51 .52 2 .59 16 13
Trades & Production .52 .63 21 .70 35 11
Service, Sport & .57 .66 16 .66 16 0
Recreation
OveralP .56 .64 14 .72 29 13
* Includes other non-comparable occupational groupings
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Income Distribution 1968-69, Table 58 (Ref.
No. 17.17); Income Distribution 1973-74, Table 24 (Ref. No. 17.6); Income Dis-
tribution Australia, 1978-79, Individuals, Table 18 (Cat. No. 6502.0).
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Table 5
Income Distribution by Age of Full-Year, Full-Time Female
Workers Aged 15-54, Mean Earned Income
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54
1968-69 .19 .27 .27 .27
1973-74 .20 .28 .26 .26
1978-79 .21 .28 .26 .26
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Income Distribution 1968-69, Tables 59 & 63
(Ref. No. 17.17); Income Distribution 1973-74, Tables 27 & 30 (Ref. No. 17.6);
Income Distribution Australia, 1978-79, Individuals, Tables 22 & 23 (Cat. No.
6502.0).
Australia's experience with women's pay, then, can help us analyze
the United States experience. Australia is a no-discrimination (or at
least a low-discrimination)' 8 comparator against which we can judge
the treatment of women workers in this country. Further, Australia
provides a case study of a successful attempt to raise the relative
wages of women. By analyzing the case study, we can both assess the
likely effects of attempts to raise relative female wages that might be
tried in the United States and evaluate alternative methods of raising
women's wages.
III. WOMEN'S WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES-
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE AUSTRALIAN
EXPERIENCE
The female-to-male wage ratios in Australia and the United States
were very similar when Australia's wage-setting tribunals explicitly
discriminated against women. Beginning in 1969, when Australia be-
gan to do away with that explicit discrimination, the wage ratios of the
two countries began to look quite different (Figure 1). The casual in-
ference from these facts is that there is sex discrimination in wage
setting in the United States. Even though sex discrimination in wage
setting is not explicit in the United States, our wage ratio looked like
Australia's when they clearly discriminated against women, and began
to look much different when they did away with that discrimination.
This section will begin by examining the legal doctrines used to in-
crease the wage ratio in Australia: How similar were the efforts under
181. Despite the beneficial changes precipitated by the Equal Pay Decisions, women in
Australia are still paid less than men. Some commentators in Australia believe
that the difference results from continuing wage discrimination against women.
Jane Stackpool-Moore, From Equal Pay to Equal Value in Australia: Myth or
Reality?, 11 ComP. LAB. L.J. 273 (1990); Short, supra note 139. See also Gregory &
Anstie, supra note 66, at 15-20 (pockets of wage discrimination persist, but the
level is small at the aggregate level); Bruce J. Chapman & Charles Mulvey, An
Analysis of the Origins of Sex Differences in Australian Wages, 28 J. INDUs. REL.
504 (1986)(analysis of 1982 data indicates some residual wage discrimination).
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Figure 1
Female-to-Male Wage Ratios in Australia
and the United States, 1960-1988
1955 1975 1985
Sources: Australia:
U.S.:
Year
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Average Earnings and
Hours of Employees (Cat. No. 6304.0).
Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, TIME OF
CHANGE: 1983 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN'S WORKERS 82
(1983); CENsus BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SERiEs P-60, CuRRENT POPULATION REPORTS (various
issues).
the Equal Pay Decisions in Australia to equal pay and comparable
worth in the United States? Next, the casual inference of discrimina-
tion arising from the Australian experience will be examined to see if
it can withstand more rigorous analysis. Finally, this section will dis-
cuss the relevance of the Australian experience to women's wages in
the United States. Since the Australian method of increasing women's
wages-changing the policy of wage-setting boards-is clearly not di-
rectly applicable in this country, what are the lessons of the Austra-
lian experience for the United States?
A. Equal Pay and Comparable Worth in the United States: Are the
Australian Equal Pay Decisions Equivalent?
The legal doctrines announced in the Australian Equal Pay Deci-
sions bear a strong resemblance to the American legal doctrines of
equal pay and comparable worth. The commentators say that the
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Australian and American doctrines are equivalent. 8 2 But are they?
The Australian Equal Pay Decision in 1969183 and the American
Equal Pay Act of 1963184 both seem to adopt the same antidiscrimina-
tion principle-the principle of "equal pay for equal work."' 8 5 The
1969 Decision and the Equal Pay Act both require women to be paid
the same as men for work that is the same in content.1 8 6 Neither re-
quires women to prove that the jobs of men and women are identical
to claim equal pay; substantial identity in the content of the jobs is
sufficient. 8 7
Despite these similarities, however, the "equal pay for equal work"
principle is not the same in the two countries. In one important re-
spect, the Australian principle is broader than the American principle.
In the United States, women can only compare their work with the
work of men employed by the same employer in the same establish-
ment.'8 8 Under the 1969 Decision in Australia, women are not limited
182. See, eg., KILLINGSWORTH, supra note 172, at 239-40 (the 1972 equal pay decision
"is indeed a form of comparable worth"); HENRY J. AARON & CAMMAN M.
LOUGY, THE COMPARABLE WORTH CONTROVERSY 40 (1986)(through the 1972 deci-
sion, Australia "establish[ed] the principle of equal pay for comparable worth");
Mitchell, supra note 14, at 133 (the 1972 decision was "roughly equivalent to the
'comparable worth' notion currently under debate in the United States").
183. Equal Pay Cases 1969, 127 C.A.R 1142, 1156 (1969).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1988).
185. Neither the principles announced by the Commission in Australia nor the statu-
tory language of the American Equal Pay Act use the term "equal pay for equal
work." Nevertheless, both clearly pursue that principle. In Australia, the Com-
mission in adopting the principles said that it accepted the concept of "equal pay
for equal work," Equal Pay Cases 1969,127 C.A.R. 1142,1153,1156 (1969), and the
term is used in the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act in the United States to
describe the underlying principle of the Act. H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C-.N. 687.
186. In Australia, see Principle 4 of the Equal Pay Cases 1969, 127 C-A.R. 1142, 1158
(1969). In the United States, see the language of the Equal Pay Act. 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1988).
187. In Australia, see, e.g., Federal Meat Industry Interim Award, 129 C-.AR. 743, 744
(1969)(complete interchangeability of jobs is not required) and Meat Processing
Interim Award, 171 C.AI. 661, 667-68 (1975)(citing several cases in which com-
plete identity of jobs was not required). In the United States, see, e.g., Shultz v.
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1970), cert denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970)(Equal Pay Act requires only a showing of "substantially equal work");
and Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 203 n.24 (1974)(jobs need not
be identical in every respect for Equal Pay Act to apply). Similarly, the "least
difference" principle, in which women are permitted to compare themselves to
the male whose job duties are least different from those of the women, has been
applied in both countries. See Storemen and Packers (Wool Selling Brokers and
Re-Packers) Award, 139 C.A.R. 529, 530 (1971); CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL.,
EMPLoyMENT DISCR NATION § 17.10.2 (2d ed. 1988).
188. The Equal Pay Act provides: "No employer... shall discriminate, within any
establishment... between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to em-
ployees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages
to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work" 29 U.S.C.
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to comparisons within the establishment where they work, or even to
comparisons with other employees of their employer. 8 9 Rather, wo-
men can make comparisons with anyone working under the award or
determination which covers them and, since most awards and determi-
nations are multi-establishment and multi-employer, the range of po-
tential comparisons women can make in Australia is much broader
than the range of possible comparisons in the United States.
In other respects the Australian principle is narrower than the
American principle. First, the Australian principle, unlike the Ameri-
can principle, did not apply to female-dominated occupations. Thus,
most women working in Australia-the women working in female-
dominated occupations-were not entitled to equal pay even if men
were paid more for performing the same work.190 Second, the obliga-
tion to provide equal pay in Australia did not extend to all pay re-
ceived by women. Specifically, it did not extend to any pay differences
between men and women attributable to differences in the "margins"
and it did not extend to "overawards." Women were entitled to equal
pay with men doing the same work only with respect to their "basic"
wages.191 In the United States, when women perform the same work
as men, they are entitled to the same pay with respect to all aspects of
their remuneration, including fringe benefits.192 And third, in Austra-
lia women might not be entitled to equal pay even if they can prove
that they perform the same work as men. The 1969 Decision required
equal pay only where the work was both the same and of equal
value.193 So, at least on a theoretical level, there may be situations in
which women can prove equal work, but cannot prove the work is of
equal value and, hence, are not entitled to equal pay.194 The American
Equal Pay Act does not require any showing of equal value.195
§ 206(d)(1988)(emphasis added). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9 (1991)(defining the
meaning of establishment). See generally Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490
(1945); Brennan v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. School Dist., 519 F.2d 53 (5th Cir.
1975).
189. Principle 7 of the 1969 Decision reads as follows:
[1In considering whether males and females are performing work of the
same or like nature and of equal value, consideration should not be re-
stricted to the situation in one establishment but should extend to the
general situation under the determination or award concerned, unless
the award or determination applies to only one establishment.
Equal Pay Cases 1969, 127 C.A.R. 1142, 1159 (1969).
190. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
192. See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.10-1620.11.
193. See Principles 3, 4, and 6-9. Equal Pay Cases 1969, 127 C.A.R. 1142, 1158-59 (1969).
194. We were unable to find any cases reaching this result. But see Wool Brokers
Staffs Association, 177 C.A.R. 164, 167 (1976)(stating that the 1969 Decision re-
quires a showing both of equal work and of equal value).
195. The American Equal Pay Act, however, does contain affirmative defenses-une-
qual pay for equal work is permissible where it results from a seniority system, a
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It is difficult to assess whether and to what extent these differ-
ences between the 1969 Decision and the Equal Pay Act are important.
The reaction of the female-to-male wage ratios in the two countries in
response to the legal changes was dramatically different. In Australia,
the wage ratio immediately began to increase significantly. The wage
ratio increased 8 percent-from 58.4 percent to 63.2 percent-in the
time between 1969 when the Decision was issued and 1972 when the
next important Decision was issued.196 In the United States, the wage
ratio did not change at all in response to the Equal Pay Act.197 But the
difference in response in the two countries could have been caused by
a number of factors other than the substantive differences between
the two "equal pay for equal work" principles. For example, it may
have been that this relatively narrow type of discrimination was much
more common in Australia than in the United States or it may have
been that the very different procedures for enforcing the substantive
standards (through Commission processes in Australia and through
litigation in the United States) resulted in more effective enforcement
of the standard in Australia.
A comparison of the 1972 Equal Pay Decision in Austraia98 and
the concept of comparable worth in the United States 99 presents am-
biguities that are very similar to those presented by the comparison
between the 1969 Equal Pay Decision and the American concept of
merit system, a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of produc-
tion, or any other factor other than sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1988). If an employer
can prove one of the affirmative defenses, a woman may not be entitled to equal
pay even though she is doing the same work as a man. The "equal value" element
of cases under the 1969 Decision in Australia can be viewed as an attempt to ad-
dress the same set of cases addressed by the inclusion of affirmative defenses in
the Equal Pay Act. If that is an accurate way of viewing the "equal value" ele-
ment, the 1969 Decision in Australia would not be narrower than the American
Equal Pay Act in this respect
196. See supra Table 1.
197. The female-to-male wage ratio was virtually stable from 1955 to 1980. See WO-
MEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TIME OF CHANGE: 1983 HANDBOOK ON WO-
mEN WORKERs 82 (1983).
198. National Wage and Equal Pay Cases, 147 C.A-R 172 (1972).
199. Comparable worth has been rejected as a discrimination theory by courts in the
United States. See, ag., International Union, UAW v. Michigan, 886 F.2d 766 (6th
Cir. 1989); American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986);
AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). But see Jancey v. Everett
School Committee, No. 89-3807 (Mass. Sup. Ct., Aug. 13, 1992)(finding liability
under a state comparable worth statute). As a result, when comparable worth in
the United States is discussed in this section, reference is to the concept of compa-
rable worth as it has been articulated in the literature, a concept that has been
generally rejected by the courts. See Weiler, supra note 10; STEVEN L. WIuLBoRN,
A SECRETARY AND A COOK: CHALLENGING WOMEN'S WAGES IN THE COURTS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 127-36 (1989); Carin Ann Clauss, Compa-
rable Worth-The Theory, Its Legal Foundation, and the Feasibility of Imple-
mentation, 20 U. MxCH. J.L. REF. 7 (1986).
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equal pay. At their core, the "comparable worth" principles in the two
countries are quite similar. In the 1972 Decision, the Australian Com-
mission announced that it was implementing the principle of "equal
pay for work of equal value." The Commission said that the principle
meant that wages should be established "by a consideration of the
work performed irrespective of the sex of the worker. 20o In other
words, the principle was intended to remove the extent to which the
sex of workers influenced wage rates, even for jobs which were not
identical in job content. That central principle is the same as the com-
parable worth principle in the United States.20l Nevertheless, compa-
rable worth in Australia is not the same as comparable worth in the
United States. As with equal pay, comparable worth in Australia is
narrower in some respects and broader in other respects than compa-
rable worth in America.
The Australian conception of comparable worth is narrower than
the American conception of comparable worth in several ways. First,
the range of comparisons that can be made are generally narrower in
Australia than in the United States. The normal range for comparable
worth comparisons in Australia, as it is for equal pay comparisons, 202
is the award (that is, workers can compare themselves with other
workers working under the same award),203 while the normal range
for comparisons in the United States is the employer (workers can
compare themselves with other workers working for the same em-
ployer).204 Since awards in Australia generally cover workers doing
quite similar types of work, this range of comparison ironically makes
the range broader than in the United States for equal pay comparisons
200. National Wage and Equal Pay Cases, 147 C.A.R. 172, 179 (1972).
201. See WInzBoRN, supra note 199, at 127-36; Weiler, supra note 10, at 1777-79; Clauss,
supra note 199.
202. See Equal Pay Cases 1969, 127 C.A.R. 1142, 1159 (1969); see also supra text accom-
panying note 189.
203. Principle 5(b) of the 1972 Decision reads as follows:
Work value comparisons should, where possible, be made between fe-
male and male classifications within the award under consideration. But
where such comparisons are unavailable or inconclusive, as may be the
case where the work is performed exclusively by females, it may be nec-
essary to take into account comparisons of work value between female
classifications within the award and/or comparisons of work value be-
tween female classifications in different awards. In some cases compari-
sons with male classifications in other awards may be necessary.
National Wage and Equal Pay Cases, 147 C.A.R. 172, 180 (1972). Although the
Principle permits comparisons with male classifications in other awards, no re-
ported cases have actually made that type of comparison in an equal value case.
See Short, supra note 139, at 325.
204. Every comparable worth case in the United States has made intra-employer com-
parisons; none have made inter-employer comparisons. See, e.g., International
Union, UAW v. Michigan, 886 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1989); American Nurses' Ass'n v.
Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986); AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th
Cir. 1985).
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(because comparisons can be made across employers), but narrower
than in the United States for comparable worth comparisons (because
comparisons to workers doing different work, the essence of compara-
ble worth comparisons, is more limited).
Second, the Australian conception of comparable worth is different
and narrower than the American conception because the type of com-
parisons made is more limited. In comparable worth cases in the
United States, analytical job evaluation procedures are used to com-
pare male and female jobs. These procedures are designed to facili-
tate, and in fact do facilitate, comparisons between jobs with radically
different job duties.2 05 In Australia, analytical job evaluation proce-
dures are almost never used in equal value cases; instead, tribunals
exercise "broad judgment" to determine whether male and female
jobs are of equal value.206 Federal industrial tribunals in Australia
have been very reluctant to compare jobs with dissimilar job duties
using this standard,2 07 and this has been especially true in equal value
cases, 2 0s even though such comparisons are essential to implementa-
tion of the equal value principle. Consequently, the conception of
comparable worth is more limited in Australia than in the United
States because, in practice, jobs with dissimilar duties can be compared
in the United States, but cannot be compared in Australia.
Third, comparable worth is narrower in Australia than it is in the
United States because the principle in Australia did not require that
all wage differences attributable to sex be eliminated. The principle
in Australia only required that sex-based wage differences in the
wages established by the wage-setting tribunals be eliminated. There
205. This is not to say, however, that the procedures are value-free or uncontroversial.
For good general discussions of job evaluation types and methodologies, see Rich-
ard W. Beatty & James R. Beatty, Some Problems with Contemporary Job Evalu-
ation Systems, in COMEPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 59 (Helen
Remick ed., 1984); DONALD J. TREmAN, JOB EVALUATION: AN ANALYnc REviEw
(1979); Dov ELizUR, JOB EVALUATION: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH (1980).
206. The "broad judgment" standard was explicitly endorsed by the Commission in
the 1972 Equal Pay Case: 'Iplementation... will call for the exercise of the
broad judgment which has characterised work value inquiries." National Wage
and Equal Pay Cases 1972, 147 C A.R. 172, 179 (1972).
207. For a discussion, see Short, supra note 139, at 322-23.
208. See, ag., National Wage Case 1983, 291 CA. 3, 31 (1983)(women's groups con-
tended that implementation of 1969 and 1972 decisions had been frustrated be-
cause appropriate work value-i.e., job comparison-exercises had not been
conducted, but Commission rejected request for more extensive and frequent
comparisons); Royal Australian Nursing Federation, 28 AUS. IND. L. REV. (CCH)
1117 (1986)(Commission distinguished its equal value principles from "compara-
ble worth" saying that comparisons of unrelated or dissimilar work that are per-
mitted by comparable worth would "strike at the heart of long accepted methods
of wage fixation in this country"); Short, supra note 139, at 324 (Commission re-
lied on actual inspections of work in only two equal value cases between 1973 and
1981).
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was no requirement that sex-based wage differences in other aspects
of compensation be eliminated. Specifically, even if it could be proven
that wage differences in overawards were the result of sex discrimina-
tion, there was no requirement that those wage differences be elimi-
nated.209 In the United States, the comparable worth principle would
require that sex-based wage differences in all aspects of compensation
be eliminated.210
Finally, comparable worth in Australia is narrower than compara-
ble worth in the United States because, at least since 1986, tribunals in
Australia have been prohibited from rectifying proven sex-based wage
differences2ll if any increases would have more than a negligible ef-
fect on the economy or if any increases to women would necessitate
additional increases to other employees.212 In the United States, rem-
edies for comparable worth violations are not subject to these
limitations.213
In other respects, the comparable worth principle in Australia is
broader than the comparable worth principle in the United States. In
the United States, the comparable worth principle applies only to em-
ployers with fifteen or more employees.214 As a result, the principle
209. For a discussion of overawards, see supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
Although the wage adjustments required by the 1972 Decision were not as great
as the wage adjustments that would be required in the United States, they were
greater than the wage adjustments that were required under the 1969 Decision.
The 1969 Decision only required basic wages to be equalized, while the 1972 Deci-
sion required total wages (basic wages and margins) to be equalized. See supra
text accompanying notes 143-45, 160.
210. See supra note 192.
211. By "proven" sex-based wage differences, I mean wage differences that violate the
"equal pay for work of equal value" principle of the 1972 Decision.
212. In 1986, the Australian Commission decided that claims for wage increases based
on the 1972 Equal Pay Decision should be processed under a procedure designed
to deal with wage anomalies and inequities. Royal Australian Nursing Federa-
tion, 28 Aus. IND. L. REv. (CCH) 117 (1986). Increases could be granted under
that procedure only if there was no likelihood of flow-ons (i.e., no likelihood that
employees other than the women who had proven discrimination would receive
wage increases) and only if the economic cost was negligible. See also National
Wage Case 1983, 291 C.A.R. 3, 53-54 (1983). For an application of the anomalies
and inequities procedure to a case applying the 1972 Decision, see Royal Austra-
lian Nursing Federation, 29 Aus. IND. L. REv. (CCH) 215 (1987).
213. Although later reversed on appeal for other reasons, the District Court in
AFSCME v. Washington rejected the State's arguments that the remedy for a
comparable worth violation should be limited because of its expense and the dis-
ruption that expense would create for the State or because the remedy would
require the State to re-assess its entire wage structure. AFSCME v. Washington,
578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), rev'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). See gener-
ally Ruth Gerber Blumrosen, Remedies for Wage Discrimination, 20 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 99, 152-59 (1986).
214. Title VII provides the legal basis for the comparable worth principle in the
United States and it applies only to employers with at least fifteen employees.
Title VII, § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1988). Smaller employers could be
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applies only to about 20 percent of employers and to about 80 percent
of employees in the United States.215 In Australia, the comparable
worth principle applies to employers regardless of their size. Simi-
larly, the comparable worth principle has broader applicability in Aus-
tralia than in the United States because the marginal costs of
enforcing the principle are much lower in Australia. In Australia, the
principle is legally enforceable through a tribunal structure that is an
integral part of the normal wage-setting process. In the United States,
the principle is legally enforceable only by disrupting the normal
wage-setting process--only by a costly legal action in a non-specialized
court. In these respects, then, the comparable worth principle in Aus-
tralia is broader both legally and practically than in the United States.
These differences between the Australian and American concep-
tions of equal pay and comparable worth both are and are not signifi-
cant. The differences are significant to the extent one attempts to use
the Australian experience to make precise predictions of what would
happen in the United States if our conception of comparable worth
were implemented. The doctrinal differences, as well as the very sig-
nificant institutional differences between the two countries, indicate
that such an enterprise is especially hazardous. On the other hand,
the differences are not very significant to the extent one attempts to
make more general comparisons, for example, as we will do in the
next section of this article, to compare a "low" discriminator society
(Australia) with a "high" discriminator society (United States). This
more modest enterprise should permit us, first, to make progress in
determining whether discrimination is present in the "high" discrimi-
nator society and, second, to make a lower-bound estimate of the ex-
tent of discrimination. Although the doctrinal differences may make
it difficult or impossible to determine whether implementation of the
American conception of comparable worth in the United States would
eliminate only some, or all, or more than the amount of discrimination
uncovered by the comparison, the more modest enterprise is worth-
while because there is considerable debate about the presence of wage
discrimination in the United States and because the estimate of the
extent of discrimination can help to confirm or undermine estimates
that have been made in other ways.
reached under many state laws prohibiting discrimination, but the major compa-
rable worth cases have all been filed under federal law. See, e.g., International
Union, UAW v. Michigan, 886 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1989); American Nurses' Ass'n v.
Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986); AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th
Cir. 1985).
215. U.S. SmALL Busunss ADnMIsSATION, TiE STATE OF SMALL Busunss: A RE-
PORT OF THE PRESIDENT 62-63, 90-91 (1988).
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B. Is There Sex Discrimination in Wage Setting in the United States?
Workers are paid to work and, in a world that operated strictly on
neoclassical economic principles, the pay for a worker would reflect
exactly that worker's economic contribution to her employer. Work-
ers vary in their ability to make economic contributions; they vary in
their education and training, work experience, effort, commitment to
the labor market, and so forth. As a result, pay differences between
workers and groups of workers are to be expected and do not by them-
selves indicate that some workers are paid "too little." Instead, work-
ers or groups of workers, such as women, are paid "too little" only if
pay differences do not reflect lower productivity. Discrimination ex-
ists in this neoclassical world when workers of equal productivity are
paid differently.21
This conception of the labor market can be used empirically to ana-
lyze the earnings of workers. Although the economic contribution, or
productivity, of workers is very difficult to measure, it is possible to
measure worker characteristics that are likely to affect productivity.
Workers with more education or more on-the-job training (that is,
workers with more "human capital") are likely to be more productive
than workers who have less human capital.217 Measurable worker
characteristics, then, can be used as proxies for productivity.218 Using
these proxies, the pay of workers can be broken down into a portion
that is due to productivity (as measured by worker characteristics or
human capital) and a difference that is due to other factors.
The difference in pay received by men and women can be analyzed
using this conception of the labor market. If the pay difference be-
tween men and women is wholly attributable to differences in human
capital, the inference from the gross pay differential that women suf-
fer from discrimination in wage-setting is largely undermined.2' 9 Em-
ployers are discriminating not against women qua women, but against
workers who are not as productive as other workers. Since women are
216. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 39-40 (2d ed. 1971). Dis-
crimination in this sense can also occur in other circumstances. Two corollaries
of the definition of discrimination in the text, for example, would be 1) discrimi-
nation exists when workers of different productivity are paid the same, and 2)
discrimination exists when differences in pay between workers are not commen-
surate with differences in productivity between those workers. See Morley Gun-
derson & Roberta Edgecombe Robb, Legal and Institutional Issues Pertaining to
Women's Wages in Canada, 3 INT'L REv. COMP. PUB. POL'Y 129 (1991).
217. For an early discussion, see Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital,
51 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1961).
218. See DONALD J. TREIMAN & HEIDI I. HARTMANN, WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES:
EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 17-19 (1981).
219. Women may, of course, still suffer from forms of discrimination other than dis-
crimination in wage-setting, for example, discrimination that limits their oppor-
tunities to add to their stock of human capital.
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not as productive as men on average, they are paid less. On the other
hand, if the pay difference between men and women is not attributa-
ble at all to differences in human capital, the inference of discrimina-
tion in wage-setting is bolstered. Employers are paying men and
women differently even though they have the same human capital and
even though the productivity of the two groups is equal. The eco-
nomic definition of discrimination has been met.
To illustrate, assume a simple society in which the only human
capital that is valued in the labor market is years of schooling. As-
sume also that women are paid $5,000 and men are paid $6,000. To
determine whether the pay difference is caused by discrimination, one
needs to examine the difference in pay to determine whether it is
caused by differences in human capital or by differences in the returns
men and women receive for their human capital. One could do this by
fitting the following equation to the data on earnings and years of
schooling for men and women:
1) Earnings = a + b(years of schooling)
If the average "years of schooling" for both men and women in our
example were ten, one might receive the following results for men
and women respectively:
2) $6,000 = $1,000 + $500(years of schooling)
2A) $5,000 = $1,000 + $400(years of schooling)
Thus, the earnings for employees in this society could be estimated as
$1,000 plus $500 for each year of schooling for male employees or
$1,000 plus $400 for each year of schooling for female employees. In
this example, then, the human capital (or productivity) of male and
female employees fails to explain any portion of the earnings differ-
ence. The entire difference in earnings is attributable to the returns
men and women receive to their human capital. These results would
create an inference of discrimination.
Alternatively, if the average "years of schooling" in our example
were ten for men and eight for women, one might receive the follow-
ing results for men and women respectively:
3) $6,000 = $1,000 + $500(years of schooling)
3A) $5,000 = $1,000 + $500(years of schooling)
In this example, differences in human capital (productivity) explain
all of the earnings difference. The returns of men and women to their
human capital are the same. Any inference of discrimination in wage-
setting arising from the gross earnings differential has been largely
undermined.
When the pay of men and women in the United States has been
examined using this type of analysis, the inference of discrimination
arising from the gross pay differential between the two groups has
been bolstered. The study by Corcoran and Duncan is the leading
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study of this type.22 0 It was able to attribute 44 percent of the wage
gap between white men and white women to productivity factors: 2
percent was attributed to differences in formal education; 11 percent
to years of training completed on current job; 28 percent to other as-
pects of work history; and 3 percent to indicators of labor force attach-
ment. Fifty-six percent of the wage gap remained unexplained.221
The other studies of this type have been equally unsuccessful in ex-
plaining the wage gap. In the words of one reviewer, "after many em-
pirical attempts spanning more than a decade, researchers are still
unable to account for more than about half of the male-female differ-
ence in earnings through differences in productivity-related
variables."222
The unexplained portion of the wage gap between men and wo-
men, however, poses interpretation problems. To the extent the stud-
ies have been able to measure the human capital variables perfectly
and have included all relevant human capital variables in their mod-
els, a very strong inference of discrimination would arise. Unfortu-
nately, no one contends that the studies have been able to do either.22 3
As a result, there are two competing interpretations of the wage gap
that remain after accounting for productivity-related variables. 224
220. Mary Corcoran & Greg J. Duncan, Work History, Labor Force Attachment and
Earnings Differences Between the Races and Sexes, 14 J. HUM. REsOURCES 3
(1979).
221. Id. at 18. Although Corcoran and Duncan do not directly attribute the unex-
plained portion of the wage gap to discrimination, they do say that "those who
claim that the labor market treats workers 'fairly' in the sense that equally pro-
ductive workers are paid equally, are likely to be wrong." Id at 19.
It should be noted that perhaps the most prominent article on women's wages
in the legal literature contends that women are treated almost fairly in this sense.
Weiler, supra note 10, at 1779-93 (if entirely successful, comparable worth would
reduce the female-to-male wage gap by only 2-3 percentage points). Professor
Weiler's analysis, however, is significantly flawed, in essence, because he fails to
recognize the extent to which wage discrimination affects the employment deci-
sions of women, such as decisions about how much to work and what kind of
investments to make in training. For a full critique, see WILLBORN, supra note
199, at 137-46.
222. Thomas N. Daymont & Paul J. Andrisani, Job Preferences, College Major, and the
Gender Gap in Earnings, 19 J. HuM. RrsouRcas 408, 409 (1984). For surveys of
the studies, see STEVEN L. WILLBORN, A CoMPARABLE WORTH PRIMER 13-15
(1986); TREnIAN & HARTmANN, supra note 218, at 20-21.
223. Researchers who have quite different ideas about the extent of wage discrimina-
tion in the labor market and the appropriateness of governmental intervention to
deal with it, agree that application of the human capital model presents signifi-
cant and difficult problems. See e.g., Mincer, supra note 1, at S22-S23; Gregory &
Ho, supra note 14, at 8-10. But see Joni Hersch, Male-Female Differences in
Hourly Wages: The Role of Human Capital, Working Conditions, and House-
work, 44 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 746 (1991)(study claiming to control for all
relevant productivity-related variables still finds a large portion of the wage gap
to be unexplained).
224. The persistence of the gap may also indicate that the human capital theory is
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First, the gap may be simply an artifact of imprecise research meth-
ods. It may be caused by the mismeasurement and omission of human
capital variables.22 5 According to this interpretation, if we could pre-
cisely measure all of the relevant human capital variables, the gap
would disappear. The second interpretation is that the gap is evidence
of discrimination-the gap would not disappear even if all the relevant
human capital variables could be measured perfectly. The gap,
although subject to imprecision, indicates that men and women of
equal productivity are paid differently--and that is the economic defi-
nition of discrimination.
To illustrate the problem with the mismeasurement of variables,
consider the "years of schooling" example in a slightly more complex
society. Suppose that the human capital actually valued by this society
is not "years of schooling," but instead a more complex notion of "edu-
cation." If the researcher examines the earnings disparity in this soci-
ety using "years of schooling" as a proxy for education, the results
may be significantly distorted. The researcher would not capture the
value the society places, for example, on the quality of education (the
researcher would rate equally the same number of years at Yale and
at Podunk College) or on the subject matter studied (the researcher
would rate equally X years of education leading to a medical degree
and X years of education leading to a Ph.D. in English). If males (or
females) disproportionately went to Yale or received medical degrees,
the results might overstate (or understate) the extent of
discrimination.
Similarly, the omission of variables can significantly distort results.
Consider again the example above where men were paid $6,000, wo-
men $5,000, and both had, on average, ten years of schooling. Using
that data, the results in Equations 2 and 2A would support an infer-
ence of discrimination because the returns of men and women to their
human capital are different. But assume that the society actually val-
ued two, not one, human capital characteristics---"years of schooling"
and "years of work experience"--and that the researcher failed to in-
clude the latter variable in the equation. If men had ten years of work
flawed. The theory assumes a labor market in which wages are determined in
accordance with the neoclassical theory of marginal productivity. To the extent
that that theory does not apply very well to labor markets, and many contend
that it does not, the results of studies of this type are subject to question. For
studies that question application of the theory of marginal productivity to labor
markets, see PAUL OsTERmAN, EmLOYMENT FUTURES: REORGANIZATION, DISLO-
CATION, AND PuBLIc POLiCY (1988); MICHAEL J. PIORE, UNEMPLOYMENT AND IN-
FLATION: INSTITUTIONAL AND STRucTuRALisT VIEWS (Michael J. Piore ed., 1979);
HENRY PHELPs BROWN, THE INEQUALITY OF PAY (1977). For a discussion of the
implications of rejection of the human capital theory to the comparable worth
debate, see infra notes 23841 and accompanying text.
225. For a brief review of these measurement problems, see TREIMAN & HARTMANN,
supra note 218, at 18-19.
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experience and women had five, one might receive the following re-
sults for men and women respectively:
4) $6,000 = $1,000 + $300(years of schooling)
+ $200(years of work experience)
4A) $5,000 = $1,000 + $300(years of schooling)
+ $200(years of work experience)
Omission of the "years of work experience" variable distorted the re-
sults in Equations 2 and 2A creating the appearance of discrimination
(differences in returns to human capital) when in fact there was none.
Intra-country analyses cannot make much headway against this in-
terpretation problem. Economists have refined the manner in which
they measure the human capital variables and attempted to include all
relevant variables, but society is so complex that doubts about any in-
ferences of discrimination arising from this type of analysis because of
mismeasurement and omission of variables can never be definitively
resolved.
A cross-country comparison with Australia, however, provides a
mechanism for addressing this interpretation problem. It provides
one measure of the extent to which the unexplained gap is caused by
discrimination and the extent to which it is caused by measurement
error. On the assumptions that Australia is a no- or low-discrimina-
tion comparator and that the work forces of Australia and the United
States are sufficiently similar that omitted and mismeasured variables
have a similar effect in the two countries, a comparison of the two
countries can divide the gap in the United States that is unexplained
by productivity variables into a portion that is due to the omission and
mismeasurement of variables and a portion that is due to
discrimination.
The first step in this process is to analyze the wage difference be-
tween men and women in the United States to determine how much
of the difference can be accounted for by an (admittedly imperfect)
analysis of productivity differences between men and women. The
rest of the difference, then, is due to other factors-either to differ-
ences in the returns men and women receive for their productivity
(which is the economic definition of discrimination) or to the omission
and mismeasurement of variables.
To illustrate, assume that men are paid $10,000, women $6,000, and
that we use "years of work experience" as our proxy for productivity.
Assume also that men average 18 years of work experience and wo-
men average 14 years. Our analysis, then, might yield the following
results for men and women respectively:
5) $10,000 = $1,000 + $500(years of work experience)
5A) $ 6,000 = $1,000 + $357(years of work experience)
Productivity differences, then, at least to the extent we were able to
measure them accurately, explain some but not all of the difference in
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male and female earnings. By substituting the average human capital
of women (14 years of work experience) into the male equation, one
can determine that women would be paid $8,000 if they received the
same return to their human capital as men. Thus, one-half ($2,000) of
the raw earnings gap of $4,000 can be explained by differences in the
human capital of men and women.2 6 A $2,000 gap remains to be
explained.
The second step of the process is to conduct a similar analysis of
the earnings of men and women in Australia. To illustrate, assume
that men in Australia earn $10,000 and women $8,000 and that men in
Australia average 20 years of work experience while women average
17.5 years. The Australian analysis, then, might yield the following
results for men and women respectively:
6) $10,000 = $1,000 + $450(years of work experience)
6A) $ 8,000 = $1,000 + $400(years of work experience)
Note that in this example men and women in Australia receive differ-
ent returns to their human capital. If women received the same re-
turns to their human capital as men (if the human capital of women is
substituted into the male equation), women would earn $8,875-more
than the $8,000 they actually earn, but less than the $10,000 earned by
men. The example presents a situation in which there is either a de-
gree of residual discrimination against women in Australia, or impre-
cision in the ability to measure returns to human capital.
The third step of the process is to place American men and women
into the Australian wage structure to determine how they would be
paid (relative to each other) in a wage structure that we are assuming
to be a no- or low-discrimination structure. In our example, then, the
human capital endowments of men and women in the United States
(18 and 14 years of work experience respectively) would be placed into
the Australian equations to yield the following equations for men and
women:
7) $9,100 = $1,000 + $450(18)
7A) $6,600 = $1,000 + $400(14)
If American men and women were paid according to the Australian
wage structure, the female-male earnings ratio would be about 72 per-
cent ($6,600/$9,100).
This type of analysis yields interesting results. The first step of the
analysis determines the proportion of the unadjusted wage gap in the
United States that is attributable to productivity differences between
226. Because differences in earnings caused by differences in human capital are as-
sumed to be legitimate (that is, not to be caused by discrimination), this type of
analysis is likely to lead to an underestimate of discrimination. Any discrimina-
tion suffered by women in the acquisition of human capital would not be cap-
tured by this type of analysis. See Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Fffort, and
the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. LAB. ECON. S33, S42 (1985).
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men and women. The analysis determines the wage structure for men
(that is, it determines the returns men receive for their human capi-
tal), substitutes the human capital of women into the male wage struc-
ture, and then compares the actual earnings of women with the
earnings women would receive if they enjoyed the same returns to
human capital as men. Table 6 reports the results of this step of the
analysis for our hypothetical. Fifty percent of the unadjusted wage
gap between men and women ($2,000 of $4,000) was explained by dif-
ferences in the human capital endowments of men and women, leav-
ing a productivity-adjusted female-male earnings ratio of 80 percent
($8,000/$10,000).
The second step of the analysis uses the same model used in the
first step to determine the wage structures for men and women in
Australia, a comparator whose wage structures are assumed to be free
of wage discrimination. The third step of the analysis places the
human capital of American men and women into the "non-discrimina-
tory" Australian wage structures. The difference between the female-
male earnings ratios under the American versus the Australian wage
structures is our measure of discrimination. In the hypothetical, once
again as reported in Table 6, the female-male earnings ratio was 60
percent within the American wage structure and 72 percent within
the Australian wage structure. Thus, 30 percent of the unadjusted
wage gap between American men and women (12 percent of the 40
percent wage gap) was caused by differences in the "discriminatory"
American wage structure and the "non-discriminatory" Australian
wage structure.
The analysis, although an improvement over a non-comparative
analysis, is still likely to leave a significant portion of the wage gap
unexplained. In our hypothetical, as Table 6 indicates, 20 percent of
the wage gap remained unexplained. The "unexplained" category cap-
tures two sources of differences between male and female wages.
First, the category captures any degree of residual wage discrimina-
tion against women in Australia. The "discrimination" category was
estimated by assuming that the Australian labor market was free of
discrimination, by assuming that any differences in pay between men
and women in Australia that were not explained by productivity dif-
ferences were caused by the omission and mismeasurement of vari-
ables. If the Australian labor market is not actually free of
discrimination, the estimate of discrimination in the United States will
be too low by the magnitude of the discrimination in Australia and the
"unexplained" estimate will be too high by that magnitude. Second,
the "unexplained" category captures the effect of human capital vari-
ables that are omitted and mismeasured to the same extent in both
countries. In both the United States and Australia, for example, men
who work full-time work 9 percent more hours than women who
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Table 6
Breakdown of U.S. Female-Male Earnings Ratio in a
Hypothetical Case
Female-Male Earnings Ratios
Adjusted for Within Aus.
Unadjusted Productivity Wage Structure
60% 80% 72%
Proportion of Earnings Gap Explained By.
Productivity Discrimination Unexplained
50% 30% 20%
work full-time.227 If the equations do not account for this difference
in human capital (as ours below do not), the results from the within
country analyses in both countries will underestimate the extent to
which human capital differences account for the pay differences be-
tween men and women. Differences in relative hours worked, how-
ever, do not account for relative pay differences between countries-
those differences would be included in the "unexplained" category.
Better measurement of human capital variables would result in an in-
crease in the "productivity" category and a corresponding decrease in
the "unexplained" category.
The analysis we have conducted using this methodology indicates
that a significant portion-about one-third-of the wage gap between
men and women in the United States is attributable to discrimination.
Conceptually, we modelled the wage structures in the United States
and Australia as follows:
Earnings = a + b(education)
+ c(work experience)
+ d(rural or urban worker)
+ e(presence of young children)
+ f(marital status)
+ g(public or private employment)
The analysis yielded the results in Table 7. Almost one-third (32.8
percent) of the female-male earnings gap in the United States is at-
tributable to sex discrimination. (For a more complete report of the
analysis and results, see Appendix A.)
This type of analysis can be criticized in a number of ways. Most
obviously, of course, its two major and explicit assumptions can be
questioned. First, the analysis assumes that Australia is a non-dis-
criminatory comparator. On the one hand, it could be (and has been)
227. Gregory & Ho, supra note 14, at 19 n.U1. These statistics are for 1981, the year we
analyze later in this Article.
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Table 7
Breakdown U.S. Female-Male Earnings Ratio, 1981
Female-Male Earnings Ratios
Adjusted for Within Aus.
Unadjusted Productivity Wage Structure
61.3% 66.3% 74.0%
Proportion of Earnings Gap Explained By:
Productivity Discrimination Unexplained
12.9% 32.8% 54.3%
argued that, despite the improvements in relative female wages, wage
discrimination against women in Australia has not been completely
eliminated.228 To the extent this is true, it does not undermine the
analysis; instead it indicates that the estimate of discrimination in the
United States should be viewed as a lower-bound estimate.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the United States is the
non-discriminatory comparator and that the Australian wage system
discriminates in favor of women. If true, this argument would mean
that the "discrimination" category which we have used to indicate the
extent of discrimination against women in the United States is instead
a measure of the extent of discrimination in favor of women in Aus-
tralia. There are reasons from both sides of the Pacific, however, for
doubting the validity of this criticism. In Australia, the history of wo-
men's pay indicates that the present relative parity between female
and male earnings resulted from the elimination of explicit discrimi-
nation against women, rather than from attempts to discriminate in
favor of women.229 To argue that the system discriminates in favor of
women in Australia, one would have to reject this history and believe
instead that when the industrial tribunals thought they were discrimi-
nating against women for three-quarters of a century, they in fact
were not discriminating and when they thought they had eliminated
sex discrimination from the wage-setting system, they in fact had only
just recently begun to discriminate! Although less dramatic, the his-
tory of women's pay in the United States also casts doubt on this criti-
cism. To accept the United States as the non-discriminatory norm,
one would have to believe that Congress was addressing a mirage
when it acted in 1963 and 1964 to address sex-based wage discrimina-
tion; that the states were also addressing a mirage when they passed
antidiscrimination legislation 23 O and, especially, when they took spe-
228. See, e.g., Stackpool-Moore, supra note 181; Short, supra note 139; Chapman &
Mulvey, supra note 181.
229. See supra notes 91-168 and accompanying text.
230. Almost all of the states have antidiscrimination laws that are modelled after the
federal Equal Pay Act and Title VII. See Virginia Dean et al., Comparable Worth
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cial efforts to increase the pay of female public employees; 23 1 and that
the increase in the relative pay of women since 1979 is a troubling sign
of growing discrimination in favor of women, rather than a welcome
sign of increasing pay equity.
The analysis can also be criticized because of its assumption that
omitted and mismeasured variables would have a similar effect in the
two countries. It is true that to the extent these variables would not
have the same effect in the two countries, shifts could occur between
the unexplained, productivity, and discrimination categories. At the
same time, however, it is not obvious what these variables would be.
The omissions and mismeasurements would have to be sufficiently sig-
nificant to explain a substantial difference in the relative earnings of
women in the two countries. The omitted variables would have to be
variables that are not commonly used in human capital equations. We
use the standard variables, so it cannot be argued that the difference
in pay between the two countries can be explained because Australian
women possess much better educational credentials or have a great
deal more work experience than American women. The mismeasure-
ments would also have to be found in rather surprising places; we have
already looked at the unsurprising places where mismeasurement er-
ror might arise and have not found it.232 Moreover, there is no a pri-
ori reason for believing that omitted and mismeasured variables
would reduce the magnitude of the discrimination category; they could
with equal plausibility increase it. At best, then, the criticism empha-
sizes that the analysis results in an estimate, rather than a precise
measurement, of discrimination. The criticism does not provide any
assistance in deciding whether the estimate of discrimination is too
high or too low. 3
The analysis might also be questioned because of the relatively
small proportion of the female-male wage gap in the United States
that was explained by productivity. Our analysis explained 12.9 per-
under Various Federal and State Laws, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DIs.
CRMINATION 238, 238.47 (Helen Remick ed., 1984).
231. All but five states have taken some action on pay equity for public employees and
twenty states have actually made wage adjustments on pay equity grounds. NA-
TIONAL COMITITEE ON PAY EQUITY, PAY EQUITY ACTIVITY IN THE PUBUC SEC-
TOR, 1979-89, at 19-73 (1989).
232. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
233. The analysis could also be questioned for a number of statistical reasons. See
Ramona Paetzold, Statistical Model Building in Title VII Litigation. Further Re-
gression Diagnostics are Needed (Jan. 1990)(available from Professor Willborn).
The statistical questions are important, but we have not addressed them in this
article; instead, we have used statistical techniques that are commonly accepted
in human capital studies. As with omitted and mismeasured variables, to the ex-
tent the statistical criticisms are valid, they emphasize that the results are esti-
mates, but do not provide any assistance in deciding whether the estimate of
discrimination is too high or too low.
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cent of the wage gap based on productivity differences; as indicated
above, other researchers have explained as much as 44 percent of the
wage gap based on productivity differences.23 4 This difference in the
explanatory power of productivity, however, is not of major concern.
The analyses in Australia and the United States both attributed very
close to the same amount of the female-male wage difference to pro-
ductivity. If the analyses in the two countries had explained more of
the wage gap based on productivity, the magnitude of the figure in the
"productivity" category would have increased and the magnitude of
the figure in the "unexplained" category would have decreased. The
figure in the category of most interest to us-the figure in the "dis-
crimination" category-would have been unchanged.
Finally, the analysis might be questioned because of the different
conceptions of equal pay and comparable worth in the United States
and Australia.2 w Criticism based on the different legal definitions of
discrimination would have great weight if the analysis were intended
to demonstrate what would happen in the United States if comparable
worth were implemented. The analysis in this section, however, is not
intended to do that. The analysis is intended to support the argument
that wage discrimination is present in wage-setting in the United
States and to provide an estimate of the extent of the discrimination.
Except to the extent that the estimate may be on the low-side because
the legal definition of comparable worth in Australia may be too nar-
row to ferret out all sex-based wage discrimination, differences
between the legal definitions of comparable worth in the United
States and Australia are largely irrelevant to the estimate of
discrimination.236
In summary, a more rigorous analysis of women's wages in Austra-
234. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 182-215 and accompanying text.
236. The analysis might also be questioned because it is based on 1981 data that do not
reflect more recent increases in the female-male earnings ratio in the United
States. The U.S. ratio increased from 59.2 percent in 1981 to 71.1 percent in 1990.
CENsus BuREAu, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIEs P-60 CuRRENT POPULATION
REPORTS (1981 & 1990). While a replication based on more recent data would be
worthwhile (the most recent acceptable data from Australia is from 1986), it is
unlikely that the estimate of discrimination would be significantly different.
Studies of the increase in the earnings ratio in the United States during the 1980s
have determined that the increase was caused, not by reductions in discrimina-
tion, but by increases in the human capital of women relative to men. June
O'Neill, The Wage Gap Between Men and Women in the United States, 3 INTL
REV. COMP. PuB. POL'Y 353, 367 (1991); JAMES P. SmrTH & MICHAEL P. WARD,
WOMEN'S WAGES AND WORK IN THE TwENTmrH CENTURy (1984). Thus, one
would expect an analysis based on more recent data to show that the portion of
the unadjusted wage gap that could be explained by productivity differences to be
lower and the portion attributable to discrimination to be basically unchanged
(or, perhaps, a bit higher). But see Steven L. Willborn, Economic and Legal Per-
spectives on Women's Wages in Six Countries: An Overview, 3 INT'L REV. COMP.
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lia and the United States tends to support the inference that women
workers in the United States suffer from sex-based wage discrimina-
tion. The analysis tends to eliminate two possible explanations for the
low relative wages of women-productivity differences and measure-
ment error-while providing an independent estimate of the extent of
discrimination. The estimate of discrimination-32.8 percent of the
wage gap-translates into more than a $2,500 annual penalty for each
full-time working woman in the United States.237
C. Women's Wages in the United States-Messages from Australia
The Australian method of increasing women's wages-changing
the policy of wage-setting boards-is clearly not directly applicable in
the United States. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be drawn from
the Australian experience-lessons that relate to women's wages in
the United States, but also lessons that extend to broader debates that
arise whenever governments contemplate intervening in the labor
market.
The Australian experience, first and perhaps most importantly,
contains important lessons about theoretical approaches to wages and
the wage gap. The human capital model is by far the predominant
model in use today. But the human capital model cannot explain the
large difference in the relative levels of women's pay in Australia and
the United States, nor can it explain the large and sudden increase in
relative women's wages in Australia between 1969 and 1975. Alterna-
tive theoretical models--models that pay greater attention to institu-
tions and rigidities in the labor market-must be developed to
understand wage issues better and to provide better guidance to those
making policy decisions about wages.
The importance of developing alternative theoretical models to ex-
plain wages (and indeed the labor market more generally) cannot be
overstated. Economists in the United States, using the human capital
model and its neoclassical cousins, have estimated that implementa-
tion of comparable worth would result in a "9.7% increase in the ex-
isting inflation rate" and a "substantial increase in unemployment."238
PUB. POL'Y 1, 5-6 (1991)(the human capital model often does not respond as ex-
pected to changes across time and countries).
237. During the ten-year period from 1981 to 1990, 32.8% of the wage gap between
year-round, full-time male and female workers ranged from $2,608 (in 1983) to
$2,968 (in 1988). For a woman who worked the entire ten-year period, the cumu-
lative wage gap caused by discrimination (as measured by this study) would have
been $27,879. CENSus BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COmimCE, SERiES P-60 CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS (1981-1990).
238. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund at
37, AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 ( 9th Cir. 1985)(No. 84-3569). Others,
of course, have predicted more modest effects. See e.g., KILLGSWORTH, supra
note 172, at 280-82; ALDPicH & BUCHELE, supra note 173, at 154-72.
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Similar predictions were made in Australia prior to their equal pay
efforts.23 9 The predictions in Australia were very much wide of the
mark.2 40 But, although the absence of such dire adverse consequences
in Australia is some evidence that those consequences would not occur
in the United States if the relative level of women's wages were in-
creased here, there is no guarantee. The predictions in Australia were
in error because they did not adequately consider the effects of institu-
tions and rigidities in the labor market, but to the extent labor market
institutions are different in the United States and Australia (and they
are very different, but we do not know to what extent the differences
matter) and to the extent there are rigidity differences, Australia is
not a reliable guide. The Australian experience undermines our confi-
dence in the human capital model (and other models based on neoclas-
sical economics), but it has not yet generated a replacement.
Alternative theoretical models are needed so that the consequences of
intervening in the labor market can be better assessed. The need to
make such assessments, and their importance for deciding whether in-
terventions should be made, includes interventions with women's pay
in mind, but it also extends to interventions for a wide range of other
purposes.241
The Australian experience also helps us to identify elements of a
successful public program designed to deal with women's wages.
Although the focus in this article has been on Australia, the United
States has also had an active public program to reduce the extent of
wage discrimination against women and, hence, to increase women's
wages. The Equal Pay Act of 19632=2 requires men and women who
are performing virtually identical work to be paid the same, and Title
VII243 makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against women in
wages,244 as well as in other aspects of the employment relationship.
239. Richard Blandy, Equal Pay in Australia?, 5 J. INDUs. REL. 13, 26 (1963).
240. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
241. Governments intervene in the labor market for a wide variety of purposes. They
might intervene, for example, to require employers to pay minimum wages, to
provide a certain level of maternity benefits, to provide a safe workplace, to sup-
ply information about plant closings, to pay severance pay, to provide a certain
level of health insurance, and so on. For citations to examples of all of these
types of interventions, see Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights
and the Standard Economic Objection Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV.
101, 109-10 (1988). Leading commentators in the United States predict that these
interventions will continue and increase. Summers, supra note 13, at 24-27.
242. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1988).
243. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17(1988).
244. The courts have uniformly rejected challenges to women's wages under Title VII
that have relied exclusively on job evaluation studies to prove discrimination. See
supra note 199. Plaintiffs, however, have had modest success in wage discrimina-
tion cases under Title VII using more sophisticated evidence, such as econometric
studies. See, e.g., Melani v. Board of Higher Educ., 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y.
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Most states have equivalent laws.24 5 The efforts in the United States,
however, have, at best, reduced only marginally the portion of the
earnings gap between men and women caused by wage discrimina-
tion.246 What explains the dramatic success of the efforts in Australia
and the relative lack of success in the United States?
One explanation for the difference in results is the difference in
enforcement procedures that were used in the two countries. In the
United States, the principal enforcement mechanism was litigation.
To be effective as an enforcement mechanism, litigation requires a
number of conditions to be present that may not be present in the real
world. For example, it requires that potential plaintiffs have informa-
tion about both the law and the wage-setting practices of their employ-
ers, that potential plaintiffs be protected adequately from reprisals,
and that some type of correction be made for the "public goods" prob-
lem with equal pay recoveries. 2 47 Even if these conditions are met,
litigation as an enforcement mechanism has a relatively high marginal
cost.248 Litigation as the principal enforcement mechanism for equal
pay efforts, then, may well lead to significant under-enforcement of
laws designed to address the problem of women's wages.249
In Australia, by contrast, the policies designed to address women's
wages were implemented through the industrial tribunals as part of
the normal wage-setting process. Equal pay policies were not a foreign
and disruptive element in the process. Further, the marginal cost of
enforcement was low since the parties would have been before the in-
dustrial tribunals discussing wages even in the absence of any equal
pay policies. Incorporating equal pay policies into the normal wage-
setting process--and avoiding litigation to the extent possible--en-
hances the likelihood that the policies will have their intended
effect.250
1983); Mecklenburg v. Montana State Bd. of Regents, 13 E.P.D. 11,438 (D. Mont.
1976).
245. Dean et al., supra note 230.
246. See supra note 236. The increases in Australia and the United States were dis-
tributed across women quite differently. In Australia, the gains were distributed
to women quite equally by income, industry, occupation and age. See supra note
180 and accompanying text. In the United States, the gains came from increased
wages for white, young, unmarried and well-educated women. The wages of all
other subgroups of women remained relatively stable. VIcTOR R. FUCHS, WO-
MEN'S QUEST FOR EcoNoIsc EQUALITY 82-83 (1988).
247. Gunderson & Robb, supra note 216, at 135-36.
248. WILLBORN, supra note 199, at 154.
249. Litigation as an enforcement mechanism for policies designed to increase the rel-
ative level of women's wages has failed not only in the United States, but also in a
number of other countries. See Willborn, supra note 236, at 1, 7-9.
250. This has been true not only in Australia, but also in a number of other countries.
The female-to-male wage ratios in Sweden and the United Kingdom, for exam-
ple, increased when the countries incorporated equal pay principles into their
normal wage-setting processes. Willborn, supra note 236.
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For the United States, this does not mean that it should consider
wage-setting tribunals. Rather, it means that if the United States is to
address the issue of women's wages seriously, it must take steps
designed to incorporate equal pay principles, broadly defined, into the
normal wage-setting processes in this country. The goal would be to
create incentives, on the demand side, for employers to reconsider
their wage structures with pay equity in mind25l and, on the supply
side, for women to participate more fully in the labor market. 52 Liti-
gation would still have a role to play,253 but it would not be the princi-
pal vehicle for changing the wage ratio between men and women.
Another element of a successful public program to deal with wo-
men's wages is "visibility" or "transparency" of the wage system and
of the wage inequity the program is designed to address. Compared
with the United States, the wage system in Australia is very central-
ized and public. Employers in Australia are required to pay minimum
wages that are established by industrial tribunals after public hearings
and, more often than not, the actual wages paid are the established
minima. By contrast, in the United States the responsibility for set-
ting wages is primarily within the control of individual firms.254 In
addition, prior to 1969 in Australia the industrial tribunals eaplicitly
discriminated against women, so the wage inequity to be addressed
was quite "visible." In the United States, perceptions of wage inequi-
ties rest on differences in the average earnings of male and female
251. Employers might be encouraged to do this by extending contract compliance re-
quirements to include a pay equity component or by offering tax incentives to
employers that provide benefits of special interest to women (for example, child-
care subsidies or parental leaves). See Weiler, supra note 10, at 1805-07; Fuchs,
supra note 246, at 117-38. More drastically, employers could be required to en-
gage in self-studies of their wage structures (including the extent to which wages
flow to men and women), to disclose and discuss the study with current employ-
ees, and to disclose the study to prospective employees. The province of Ontario
in Canada has already enacted a program along these lines. See Gunderson &
Robb, supra note 216.
252. Women might be encouraged to participate more fully in the labor market by
adopting child-centered policies, FucHS, supra note 246, at 130-38, 145-52, and by
creating tax incentives to encourage couples to substitute work in the labor mar-
ket by the husband with work in the labor market by the wife. Laura Ann Davis,
Comment, A Feminist Justication for the Adoption of an Individual Filing Sys-
tem, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 197 (1989); Gary Burtless, Taxes, Transfers, and Swedish
Labor Supply, in BARRY P. BoswoRTH Er AL., TE SWEDISH EcoNoMY 185, 188-92
(Barry P. Bosworth & Alice M. Rivlin eds., 1987).
253. For example, litigation would still be useful for addressing isolated but severe
discrimination, and as a public statement of our society's commitment to eradicat-
ing sex discrimination. See WuLBoRN, supra note 199, at 144-46.
254. The government exerts some control over wage-setting through laws such as the
minimum wage laws, but such laws affect only a small minority of the labor force.
Unions could also serve as a centralizing force and a mechanism for making wage-
setting more public, but the proportion of the work force represented by unions is
relatively small.
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workers, differences which are well-known, but which can be attrib-
uted to factors other than discrimination.
Visibility was an important element in the Australian effort on wo-
men's wages. It made it possible to identify a major source of the pay
discrepancy between men and women, to reach a societal consensus
that that source was improper, to determine the appropriate response,
and to act on that response. Other countries, most notably Canada25 5
and the countries of the European Community,256 have recognized
that increasing visibility is an important first step in dealing with the
issue of women's wages.
Once again, the existence of visibility as an element of a successful
program to deal with women's wages does not mean that the United
States should increase visibility by adopting Australia's labor market
institutions. But it does mean that if the United States is to address
the issue of women's wages seriously, it must take steps designed to
increase visibility that will mesh well with our labor market institu-
tions. One possibility would be to adopt the European Community's
approach and encourage employers to increase the visibility of their
wage structures by shifting the burden of proof in wage discrimination
cases to employers if their wage structures do not meet certain stan-
dards of visibility.25 7 Or, more intrusively, the approach in Ontario
could be adopted, which would require large employers to conduct a
job evaluation and develop a pay equity plan.258
The message from Australia is most direct and most clear on the
issue of the visibility of wage inequities in the United States. Analysis
of the Australian experience solves the insurmountable measurement
problem of within-countries studies and discloses more clearly than
ever before that a significant portion of the wage gap in the United
States is caused by discrimination. The question that remains, how-
ever, we must address without Australia's help: Do we care?
255. Gunderson & Robb, supra note 216.
256. Handels-og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark v. Dansk Arbejd-
sgiverforening (acting for Danfoss), 1989 E.C.R. 3199, 1 C.M.L.R. 8. For a discus-
sion of the case, see Christopher McCrudden, Between Legality and Reality: The
Implrnentation of Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value in Great Britain, 3 INT'L
REv. COMp. PUB. POL'Y 179 (1991).
257. See supra note 256.
258. Pay Equity Act 1987, R.S.O. ch. 34 (1987). See Gunderson & Robb, supra note 216.
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APPENDIX
Sample: Full-time wage and salary earners ages 15-54 drawn from the
Household Sample File of the Australian Bureau of Statistics' Census
of Population and Housing (1981 Census) and the March, 1982 Current
Population Survey of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census (reporting on the status of individuals in 1981). There
were 5,801 males and 4,719 females in the Australian sample and 8,787
males and 5,162 females in the U.S. sample (only half of the U.S.
dataset was used).
Equation:
E= a + Y43Xij + lp XjF + Ui
where E, is the log of earnings of the ith person, a is a constant term,
X, are human capital variables, the superscript F refers to female indi-
viduals, and Ui is an error term. Consequently, male workers earn Oj
for each human capital variable, while female workers earn (Oj + Pju)
for each variable.
The dependent variable for our regressions is the natural log of
weekly earnings. Hourly earnings were not used because good hourly
data was not available from the Australian census. The coefficients
are interpreted as percent changes in earnings with a one-unit in-
crease in the value of the independent variable.
The constant term in the U.S. equation measures the average log
earnings of a male high school graduate, urban residence, never mar-
ried, private sector, northern residence, and white. In the Australian
equation the constant term is the same as that for the United States,
except that there are no dummy variables for northern residence and
white. The coefficient for the variables that measure male endow-
ments estimate the additional payoff for men over the constant term.
The estimated coefficient for the variables that measure female en-
dowments estimate the difference in payoffs between a man and a wo-
man in the same category. For females, then, additional payoffs for a
variable are determined by adding together the male and female coef-
ficients for that variable.
Results and variable definitions follow.
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Earnings Equations for U.S. and Australian Full-time Workers,
15-54 years, 1981.
(t-statistics appear in parentheses)
U.S. Australia
R2
Dependent Variable: In W
Constant
Education
Dropout
High School
Junior College/Trade or
Certificate
College
Graduate
Female x Dropout
Female x High School
Female x Junior College
Female x College
Female x Graduate
Experience
Experience
Female x Experience
Experience2
Female x Experience2
Area
Rural
Female x Rural
Urban
Children under 18
Female x Children under 18
Marital Status
Spouse Present
Female x Spouse Present
Other Marital Status
Female x Other Marital
Status
Single, Never Married
Government
Federal
Female x Federal
State & Local
Female x State & Local
Private
.37 .37
5.3491 (265.87) 5.014
-. 2788 (-18.65) -. 1406
.1371 (10.12)
.3001 (20.36)
.3929 (24.83)
.1166 (-3.17)
.1629 (-5.28)
.1609 (-4.91)
.1472 (-4.40)
.0847 (-2.25)
.0405
.0051
.00072
.00007
.1190
.0052
.0056
.1122
.2073
-. 1968
.1613
-. 1181
.1264
.1642
-. 1561
.1572
(19.43)
(-1.51)
(-13.59)
(-.80)
(-12.33)
(-.32)
(.47)
(-6.07)
(11.88)
(-7.62)
(7.30)
(-3.78)
(5.93)
(4.49)
(-11.00)
(7.11)
.0686
.2114
.4561
.5876
-. 0332
-. 0403
-. 1534
-. 1368
-. 0899
-. 0769
.0468
-. 0039
-. 001
-. 000004
-. 1161
.0332
-. 0528
-. 1098
.1733
-. 1461
.0812
.0018
(619.20)
(-16.58)
(7.61)
(16.38)
(37.85)
(26.72)
(2.05)
(-3.09)
(4.26)
(-6.72)
(-4.24)
(-1.87)
(38.38)
(-1.92)
(-32.73)
(-.08)
(-11.47)
(1.68)
(7.54)
(-9.20)
(17.48)
(-9.37)
(5.19)
(.07)
.0949
.0427
.0321
.0485
(9.01)(2.18)
(3.97)
(3.40)
Note: Dummy variables for North/South and White/Minority were included in the
U.S. equation, but are not reported.
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Education
Dropout: US -less than 4 years high school completed
Australia -Age left school <. 15, no post-secondary degree
High School: US -completed 4 years high school
Australia -Age left school > 16, no post-secondary degree
Junior College: US -completed 1 to 3 years college
Australia -Trade Certificate Qualification
Other Certificate Qualification
College: US -completed 4 years college
Australia -Bachelor Degree Level
Graduate: US -completed 5 or more years college
Australia -higher degree level
Experience
Age - school - 6
Number of years of schooling assigned a numerical value according to classifications
above.
